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It is all about rationality as far as behavioural economics are concerned. However, no
census can be reached as to what is rationality. With the unsettled controversies over
rationality, it may help to see it from a different angle. This thesis has made a special
effort to explore some relevant issues on (ir)rationality. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 answer
the question what is irrationality. Chapter 2 improves the methodology to measure irratio -
na lity by proposing a new incentive system on individual decision-making: the prior
incentive system (Prince). Chapter 3 addresses the issue of irrationality in decisions under
ambiguity. Chapter 4 answers the question of why we steer people away from irratio -
nality. Chapter 4 discusses whether we should correct people's irrationality by imposing a
better decision when freedom of choice cannot be realized. Chapter 4 concludes with
recommending strong paternalism and provides a litmus test for people’s views on pater -
nalism. Chapter 5 answers the question how to make people less irrational. Chapter 5
studies the social influences on people’s decision-making processes and offers possible
approaches to nudge people away from irrationality.
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group members: Martijn van den Assem, Arthur Attema, Ilke Aydogan, Dennie van
Dolder, Yu Gao, Zhenxing Huang, Umut Keskin, Chen Li, Ning Liu, Rogier Potter
van Loon, Julia Muller, Asli Selim, Jan Stoop, Uyanga Turmunkh, Tong Wang, and
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Before behavioral economics, people held the general impression that economics re-
search is about utility, supply-demand, profits and markets. Economics is often
associated with politics but nothing close to our everyday life. This changed when
several books on behavioral economics made it to the non-fiction bestseller list. The
merit of behavioral economics is that it stayes real. Behavioral economics studies
how human beings actually behave without assuming that people are rational. The
key tool of behavioral economics is decision-making.
We are facing various decisions in our life, from choice of career or life partner, to
choice of travelling destination, to how much to save or which medical treatment to
receive. The consequences of these decisions are closely related to the quality of our
life. However, the truth is that even professional decision analysts do not have the
universal model to get the perfect answer for every decision problem we have. One
reason is that the dynamic world is way too complex to model. The other reason is
that there are just too many different kinds of decisions. Some decisions are trivial
daily life decisions such as which item on a menu to choose. Some decisions are of
life changing importance such as career choices. The criteria of a good decision can
heavily depend on your own tastes and preferences. However, behavioral economists
don not care whether you decide to buy an iPhone 6 or a Samsung S5. But we do
care if on the one hand you prefer iPhone 6 over Samsung S5 and iPhone 5s and
on the other hand you choose Samsung S5 when it is compared with iPhone 6 and
Samsung S3.
1
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1.1 Rationality
It is all about rationality as far as behavioral economists are concerned. The topic
of rationality will never lose its popularity among behavioral economists no matter
how trite it may sound. The ultimate aim of behavioral economists is to guide people
towards rationality and to improve their decision-making abilities. As with most pop-
ular phenomena, there is no lack of debates over rationality. Commonly speaking, a
rational decision essentially means the optimal action or the best strategy for achiev-
ing a goal in a certain situation. However, there are different standards or criteria to
evaluate optimality. Complex dynamic situations and underlying assumptions leave
rationality even more difficult to define on general grounds. A consensus has not
yet been reached among behavioral scientists (both economists and psychologists)
as to what is rational. Not to mention the possible interpretations of rationality in
sociology, political science, or philosophy.
According to classical economics, from value theory to utilitarianism, rationality
may refer to the tradeoff between the value of a good perceived by consumers and
the associated costs. Daniel Bernoulli (1738)’s theory of diminishing marginal utility
to explain the St. Petersburg paradox facilitated the development of expected utility
theory (EU). Later, EU was rationalized by von Neumann-Morgenstern’s utility the-
orem(Neumann & Morgenstern (1947)), which together with its extension through
Savage (1954)’s axioms provides the preference conditions for a rational agent who
acts in a manner isomorphic to subjective expected-utility (SEU) maximizers when
facing risk and uncertainty. SEU defines a rational agent by seven axioms, among
which completeness, transitivity, independence and continuity are often used to eval-
uate the rationality of people’s behavior when under risk. Any deviations from the
preference axioms are deemed to be irrational. The term ‘homo economicus’ is often
used to refer to a rational decision maker.
Still, in real life decisions people tend to consistently deviate from EU’s predic-
tions. It was not for long before the advanced concept of rationality was subject to
more and more doubts raised by both economists and psychologists. The main issue
is about the descriptive power of EU. Empirical tests were conducted and consistent
violations of EU were found (see for example Starmer (2000) and Trautmann and van
de Kuilen (2014)). Bounded rationality was proposed by Herbert A. Simon (1955) to
capture and justify human being’s limited cognitive ability and available resources in
the decision-making process. With bounded rationality, the person who makes the
optimal decision with given limited information is also considered to be rational.
Prospect theory was proposed to describe real life choices (Kahneman & Tversky
(1979)). In this theory, people are allowed to violate the expected utility axioms.
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Following this line of thought, some economists take transitivity and monotonicity
as the borderline to assess rationality. However, even transitivity has been questioned
by some researchers (Loomes & Sugden (1982)), who argued that intransitivity can
be rational.
1.2 Irrationality
With the unsettled controversies over rationality, it may help to see it from a dif-
ferent angle. Many behaviors are generally accepted and agreed to be irrational,
despite the continuing debates on rationality. Psychological researchers are excellent
at identifying anomalies in our decision-making processes, such as the status quo
bias, the confirmation bias, and the small sample bias, just to name a few. This
thesis investigates three research questions of irrationality.
1.2.1 What
What to be recognized as irrationality?
Before we set hands to correct irrationality, we first need proper tools to detect it.
The general method that we will use to observe irrationality from people’s behavior
is called revealed preference. Revealed preference theory assumes that the preference
of a consumer can be observed from their purchasing behavior (Samuelson (1938)).
It defines utility by observing behavior. In 1954, Savage suggested that real decision
situations for a decision maker to choose from should be used to derive the decision
maker’s real preferences. This view has led to the implementation of real incentives
in economic experiments. Real incentives are, unfortunately, not omnipotent. When
real incentives are incorrectly implemented, the preferences derived are no longer
accurate. Identification of irrationality from such revealed preferences is meaningless,
since the irrationality could be due to the improper incentives used.
Chapter 2 introduces the prior incentive system (Prince), a new system for im-
plementing real incentives in choice experiments. Prince combines the efficiency and
tractability of matching questions with the transparency and validity of binary choice
questions. Thus Prince revives matching, mainly by making the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak mechanism(Becker et al. (1964)) transparent. By reconciling matching
and choice, Prince resolves the classical preference reversals. It reduces and resolves
a number of problems of current incentive systems: (a) The income effect; (b) the
reliance on isolation; (c) strategic behavior for adaptive experiments. Its incentive
compatibility is clearer to subjects than was possible before. Not only do we avoid
14_Erim BW Li_stand.job
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
any deception of subjects, but, moreover, every subject verifies so during the ex-
periment. We demonstrate the general implementability of Prince by applying it to
standard preference measurements.
What to be corrected of irrationality?
Even though irrationality is better recognized than rationality, there are still a
number of disagreements about it. One of the main research interests in behavioral
economics today concerns decisions under ambiguity, that is, decisions in which prob-
abilities of uncertain events are unknown. Some researchers believe in a normative
status for decisions under ambiguity that deviate from expected utility, and seek to
adopt normative models to explain such decisions under ambiguity. In Chapter 3, we
show that ambiguity is not just about unknown probability but it is also associated
with beliefs and emotions. Ambiguity aversion cannot be normatively modeled. We
investigate ambiguity attitudes in five different contexts, systematically investigating
the dependence on outcomes and events and comparing these dependencies. Our
findings support event dependence of ambiguity attitudes over outcome dependence,
thus supporting event-based theories such as multiple priors, Choquet expected util-
ity, and prospect theory over outcome-based theories such as the smooth model.
Besides aversion, insensitivity plays a big role in ambiguity attitudes. We further
compared the suitedness of parametric families to capture ambiguity attitudes. For
ambiguity more than for risk, families work best if they incorporate insensitivity
(inverse-S) properly.
1.2.2 Why
Why steer people away from irrationality?
This question may sound trivial, because being more rational is naturally de-
sired by most of us. Attempts at prescriptive improvements of decisions can lead
to paternalism though. Proponents of consumer sovereignty will argue to leave peo-
ple alone who behave irrationally. And, consequently, ethical and moral objections
can be raised against paternalism. A central question in many debates on pater-
nalism is whether a decision analyst can ever go against the stated preference of a
client, even if merely intending to improve the decisions of the client. Using four
gedanken-experiments, Chapter 4 shows that this central question, so cleverly and
aptly avoided by libertarian paternalism (nudge), cannot always be avoided. The
four thought experiments, while purely hypothetical, serve to raise and specify the
15_Erim BW Li_stand.job
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critical arguments in a maximally clear and pure manner. The first purpose of Chap-
ter 4 is, accordingly, to provide a litmus test on the readers’ stance on paternalism.
We also survey and organize the various stances in the literature. The secondary
purpose of Chapter 2 is to argue that paternalism cannot always be avoided and
that consumer sovereignty cannot always be respected. However, this argument will
remain controversial.
1.2.3 How
How to correct irrationality?
Chapter 5 investigates the effects of predicting choices made by others on own
choices, following up on promising first results in the literature that suggested im-
provements of rationality and, hence, new tools for nudging. We find improvements
of strong rationality (risk neutrality) for losses, but not for gains. There are no
improvements of weak rationality (avoiding preference reversals). Overall, risk aver-
sion increases. As for the effects of own choices on predictions, the risk aversion
predicted in others’ choices is reduced if preceded by own choices, both for gains
and losses. We consider four psychological theories of risk: learning, construal level
theory, risk-as-feelings, and risk-as-value (combined with anchoring). Our results
support risk-as-value combined with anchoring and can be reconciled with risk-as-
feelings. Relative to preceding studies, we add real incentives, obtain pure framing
effects, and use simple stimuli that were maximally targeted towards our research
questions.
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Chapter 2
Prince: An Improved Method
for Measuring Incentivized
Preferences1
2.1 Introduction and background
Behavioral economics posed many challenges to the classic revealed preference paradigm
in economics. Many challenges were handled by incorporating irrationalities in deci-
sion models, as for instance in Tversky & Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory. Ex-
perimental economists initially pointed to flaws in the original experiments conducted
by behavioral economists: lack of real incentives, insufficient learning opportunities,
and sometimes deception, to defend the revealed preference paradigm.
Preference reversals (Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971)) however, were a more funda-
mental challenge - the first signs in the literature of a discrepancy between choice
and matching, calling into question the very existence of preferences. And these
fundamental challenges (Grether & Plott (1979)) were endemic in more carefully
conducted experiments.
Although some authors blame choice-based procedures (Fischer et al. (1999)).
preference reversals more often are blamed on matching techniques, in which subjects
directly indicate indifference values (reviewed by Attema & Brouwer (2013)). As a
result, binary choices are now the most common way to measure preferences, with
indifferences derived indirectly from switching values in choice lists. Binary choices
1This chapter is based on the paper “Prince: An Improved Method for Measuring Incentivized
Preferences” co-authored with Cathleen Johnson, Aure´lien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt, Dennie van
Dolder, and Peter P. Wakker
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also have drawbacks. They are more cumbersome to administer and they give interval
rather than point estimates. They also have their own biases.2
A perennial difficulty in economic experiments is that real incentives as imple-
mented in the laboratory are decontextualized and accordingly hard to understand
for subjects. The problem is greatest for matching, where the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (1964) mechanism (BDM) is often criticized for this reason.3 Both choice
and matching experiments commonly involve more than one decision. Incentivizing
all decisions leads to income effects. For this reason the random incentive system
(RIS; first proposed by Savage (1954, p. 29)) is now commonly employed. In this
system, only one of the experimental decisions, randomly selected at the end, is
implemented for real. If subjects, for each experimental decision, condition on this
being the only real one (isolation), then incentive compatibility follows. However,
subjects may conceive of the set of decisions as a meta-lottery (Holt (1986)) where,
for instance, some decisions can be used to hedge others, and spillover effects can
result.
The prior incentive method (Prince), introduced in this paper, reduces and avoids
the aforementioned problems by combining and improving a number of features from
existing incentive systems, particularly the random incentive system (RIS), the BDM,
and Bardsley’s (2000) conditional information system. In brief, the choice question
(rather than a choice option) implemented for real is randomly selected before rather
than after the experiment, is provided to the subjects in a tangible form (for example
in a sealed envelope), and subjects’ answers are framed as instructions to the exper-
imenter about the real choice implemented at the end. Incentive compatibility can
now be crystal clear, not only to homo economicus but also to homo sapiens, and
isolation is maximally salient.
Prince combines the tractability and precision of matching with improvements to
binary choice’s clarity and validity. Thus, Prince reinvents matching as the superior
mechanism for measuring preferences. Further, for adaptive experiments (where
the sequence of questions is path dependent) subjects cannot answer strategically,
and subjects know this. We thus resolve the incentive compatibility problem for
adaptive experiments. Wakker & Deneffe’s 1996 tradeoff method (TO) for measuring
utility under ambiguity now becomes available to experimental economists in properly
incentivized form.4 Finally, not only does Prince avoid deception, but, moreover,
2These biases have an older history in psychophysics (Gescheider (1997, Ch. 3)). From the
beginning (Fechner (1860)), psychophysicists used binary comparisons besides matching to measure
subjective values. The Nobel laureate Be´ke´sy (1947) introduced bisection (“the staircase method”),
to avoid the biases in choice lists (“limiting methods”).
3See, for instance, Bardsley et al. (2010, p. 271 ff.), Camerer (1995, p. 695 ff.), Noussair et al.
(2004), and Seidl (2002, p. 630 ff.).
4An advantage of the tradeoff method is that utility is not affected by probability weighting,
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nondeception is verifiably transparent to the subjects. Throughout this paper, to
illustrate Prince’s novelty, we use standard experiments with classical stimuli.
For non-experimentalists, our improved measurements of preferences shed new
light on general economic concepts. First, utility is closer to linear than tradition-
ally thought. Second, ambiguity attitudes display likelihood insensitivity besides the
well-known aversion. Third, Prince helps reveal which known choice anomalies reflect
genuine deviations from homo economicus and which are artifacts of measurement
problems. Our tests confirm that preference reversals were due to measurement prob-
lems. They do not reflect genuine intransitivities. Prince does not, however, resolve
the endowment effect, which may reflect genuine preference and, hence, a robust
discrepancy between homo sapiens and homo economicus that is no mere artifact.
Here we disagree with Plott & Zeiler (2006). We emphasize that Prince improves
measurements of preferences but not preferences themselves. The endowment effect
may be irrational but is not an appearance created by Prince.
All stimuli and material of our experiments not presented in the main text or
appendix is in the Web Appendix, in particular in part WE there.
2.2 Prince explained
This section introduces the Prince system. We explain its principles in the first two
subsections, and define them formally in section 2.2.3. Discussion is in section 2.6
and section 2.7.
2.2.1 Prince defined
The experiment begins with a real choice situation (RCS) selected from a set of
possible choice situations for each subject. In our experiments the RCS is written on
a slip of paper and put in a sealed envelope (following Bardsley (2000, p. 224)). The
RCS describes a number of choice options (two in our experiments). The subject
will receive one of these options and her goal in the experiment is to get the most
preferred one. Although the subject does not know her particular RCS, she does
receive some information such as the average, maximum, and/or minimum outcomes.
The partial description about the RCS is constructed so that each choice situation
considered during the experiment can possibly be the RCS. The subject need not
know the exact probabilities of the latter possibility, and such probabilities need not
be uniform, but they should be salient enough to motivate subjects to truthfully
answer the experimental questions(Bardsley et al. (2010, p. 220)). It is important
so that the measurements are valid for virtually all (non)expected utility theories. In particular,
collinearities between utility and probabilities are avoided.
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that the slip of paper in the selected prior envelope describes the entire RCS, with
all choice options available (section 2.7), not just one choice option.
During the experiment, various possible choice situations (candidates to be the
RCS) are presented to the subject. We explicitly ask subjects to give ”instructions”
about the real choice to be implemented at the conclusion of the experiment. This
real choice is concrete with the envelope in hand. At the end of the experiment,
the experimenter opens the prior envelope and uses the instructions provided by the
subject to select the desired option. We never ask “what would you do if” referring
to unspecified choice situations. A script with statements such as “If you write what
you want then you get what you want,” or “If you give wrong instructions, then you
don’t get what you want” further emphasize the connection between decision and
outcome. Hence, incentive compatibility is crystal clear to the subjects.
2.2.2 Prince for adaptive experiments: Problems and solu-
tions
In adaptive experiments, stimuli depend on subject responses to previous stimuli. If
traditional RISs are used, subjects may benefit (or think they benefit) from answering
a question untruthfully so as to improve future stimuli. Such gaming is impossible
with Prince, and this is obvious to the subjects, because the RCS has been determined
prior to the experiment.
For adaptive experiments, experimenters will not know exactly which choice sit-
uations will occur during the experiment. This raises two overlap problems.
1. The indeterminacy overlap problem entails the possibility that none of the
instructions from the subject pertain to the RCS, leaving the choice from the
RCS unspecified. This solution is simple: subjects may choose between the
options in the prior envelope on the spot.
2. The exclusion overlap problem arises if the partial information about the RCS
excludes some choice situations generated during the experiment, thereby re-
ducing salience and motivation for truthfulness in these excluded choice situa-
tions. To combat the exclusion overlap problem, experimenters must frame the
partial information concerning the RCS by anticipating the range of possible
choice situations generated in the experiment. They do this by using descriptive
theory and pilots. For example, in our adaptive experiment (section 2.5) we
informed subjects about a large possible outcome (>e3000). Choice situations
with very large monetary amounts could arise in our experiment, depending on
subjects’ answers.
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2.2.3 Prince summarized
We now formally list the principles that define Prince.
1. [Priority] The RCS is determined at the start, before the subject made any
decision.
2. [Tangibility] A description of the RCS is handed out to the subject in tangible
form, such as in a sealed envelope (the prior envelope).
3. [Wholeness] The description handed out to the subjects describes the entire
RCS and not just one option (such as an option is for instance a random price
in BDM).
4. [Concreteness of situation and procedure] During the experiment, we
never refer to abstract hypothetical choice situations in an unspecified situation
or procedure (“what would you prefer if . . . ”). We always refer to the RCS in
the envelope and to the action of the experimenter (“which option should the
experimenter select from your envelope . . . ”).
5. [Instructions to experimenter] We explicitly request “instructions” from
the subjects, asking them about what to select from their envelope, rather
than asking the vaguer “what would you prefer if.”
6. [No indeterminacy] For adaptive experiments: If subjects do not give in-
structions during the course of the experiment regarding the RCS, then they
can choose on the spot, after the envelope has been opened.
7. [No exclusion] For adaptive experiments: The initial description about the
RCS should be framed so as not to exclude potential choice situations faced
during the experiment.
While parts of Prince have been used before (section 2.6), their integration into
Prince is new, and is necessary to ensure the proper conditioning and transparency of
incentive compatibility. For example, all BDM implementations that we are aware of
violate Principle 3 [wholeness], leading subjects to condition the wrong way (enhanc-
ing rather than avoiding meta-lottery perceptions; section 2.7), which is arguably the
main reason for BDM’s bad performance.
In our experiments, not only the prior envelopes, but all stimuli are physical. We
use no computers although this not essential for Prince, which is why it was not
listed as a principle. Other researchers may prefer computerized implementations
of Prince. The physical availability of the RCS to every subject such as in a prior
envelope is essential though, which is why it is listed as (2) above.
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We avoid deception and, hence, the partial information about the RCS provided
must be true. Although it is not a defining principle of Prince, in our implementation
subjects could completely verify the absence of deception. First, before they received
the real payment, they could verify the correctness of the information provided about
the stimuli (Web Appendix E). Second, unlike computer randomizations, our physi-
cally generated randomizations were fully verifiable and carried out by the subjects
themselves.
2.3 Experiment 1: Reviving matching (WTA)
Experiment 1 implements PRINCE for one of the most used value concepts for non-
market goods: willingness to accept (WTA). We measured WTA for a university mug
that could be bought on campus for e5.95. Mugs are suited to test the endowment
effect (tested later) because people quickly develop attachments to them. WTA mea-
sures how much money a subject would accept in lieu of the mug, which according
to traditional theories should be the mug’s cash equivalent.
N = 30 subjects (40% female), recruited from undergraduates in the School of
Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, participated in one
classroom session. Advertisement of the study promised a e10 show-up fee plus either
a mug or additional money. Participants immediately received a mug (endowment)
along with the show-up fee.
Next, the experimenter presented 50 sealed envelopes, visibly numbered 1-50.
These were separated into 5 piles of 10 each (1-10, . . . , 41-50). Five subjects each
checked one pile to verify that each number between 1 and 50 occurred once. The
subjects placed the envelopes into a large opaque bag, shuffled them, and randomly
redistributed them over a number of smaller bags (one for each row in the classroom).
Each subject, in turn, randomly took one envelope, the prior envelope, from a bag
(without replacement). Subjects were told that their envelope described two options,
and that at the end of the session we would give them one of those two, based on
instructions that subjects would give us.
Subjects received a questionnaire reproduced in Figure 2.1, and were given a short
written explanation along with a PowerPoint presentation on the procedure. They
were told that they could give up the mug for a price: “You will write instructions,
for each possible content of your envelope (for each money amount), which of the
two options you want. At the end, we will give you what you instructed. . . . If you
write what you want, then you get what you want!” We call the question in Figure
2.1 Question 1 for later comparisons with Experiment 2.
At the end of the experiment, subjects handed in their questionnaire (instructions
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Figure 2.1 Instructions for WTA with matching and prior endowment (Question 1)
to experimenter). An experimenter opened their envelope, observes the real choice
situation specified in the envelope, and follows the instructions in the questionnaire.
Result. The average WTA was 4.99 (SD 2.41). Further results are in section 2.4.3.
Discussion of providing range 0-10 for answers. Whereas specifying a range
cannot be avoided for choice lists, it is optional for matching. We chose to specify it
here, but for comparison will not specify it later in Questions 5 and 6 in section 2.4.5.
There are pros and cons (Birnbaum (1992)). We chose the range to facilitate com-
parability with choice lists presented later.
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2.4 Experiment 2: Prince implemented in a large
experiment
In Prince, only one choice is implemented for real. Experiment 2 shows how Prince
can nevertheless be used in large experiments with many different measurements.
2.4.1 General procedure
N = 80 subjects (41.2% female) recruited from undergraduate students in School of
Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, were randomly divided
into two groups. Each group participated in one classroom session. They received a
e10 show-up fee and could gain an additional offering: money, mug, or chocolate. Ex-
perimental instructions including a short presentation were given by the experimenter
(Web Appendix WE). For each of the two sessions there were 90 envelopes, num-
bered 1-90 in random order. As with Experiment 1, these envelopes were separated
into piles of 10, checked by subjects, shuffled, explained, and randomly distributed
without replacement.
The two groups of subjects received different versions of the first question, 1-match
or 1-choice (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). These questions were part of a between-subject
test in this large experiment. Question 1 appears in Experiment 1. The remaining
eight questions, 2-9, were asked in randomized orders to all subjects in the two groups.
Each of the nine questions corresponded to a type (the term used with subjects) of
envelope, and there were 10 envelopes of each type (one for each question asked of
the subjects). The numbering (1-match/choice, 2,3,. . . ,9) of types/questions used in
this paper was not communicated to subjects. Thus each subject randomly drew an
envelope, their prior envelope containing their RCS, from 90 envelopes and then gave
9 instructions in response to 9 types/questions.
At the end of the experiment, each subject handed in their questionnaire bundle
and prior envelope. An experimenter opened the envelope, searched for the instruc-
tion in the questionnaire made operational by the RCS, and carried it out.
2.4.2 The endowment effect
Question 1-match measured subjects’ WTA for a mug, now without endowment. It
was asked of 41 of the 80 subjects. Figure 2.2 presents Question 1-match. Results
and discussion are at the end of section 2.4.3.
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Figure 2.2 Instructions for cash equivalent with matching and no prior endowment
(Question 1-match)
26_Erim BW Li_stand.job
16 Chapter 2. Prince
2.4.3 Matching versus choice lists between subjects
Question 1-choice repeated Question 1-match, again with no endowment, but now
using choice lists instead of matching, for the remaining 39 subjects. Figure 2.3
Question 1-match. The sure amount of money (the alternative to the mug) increases
with each option presented. At first, nearly all subjects preferred the mug, but by
the end nearly all subjects preferred the money. Somewhere, they switched, and the
midpoint between the two money amounts where they switched was taken as their
indifference point.
An inconsistency results if a subject takes the money when the money offer is
small but then switches to the mug when more money is offered. We allowed such
inconsistencies so as to be able to detect subjects’ misunderstandings, providing
information about the transparency of Prince.
Result of Questions 1, 1-match, and 1-choice. In the 119 choice lists presented
in this experiment (39 subjects here and all 80 subjects in section 2.4.4), there was
only one inconsistency-that is, only one switch in the wrong direction (by subject
59). In otherwise comparable studies, typically 10% of subjects have inconsistent
switches (Holt & Laury (2002)). Because this one subject exhibited other anomalies
as well (violating stochastic dominance in a later question), we removed her from our
analyses. Leaving her in would not alter our results. Table 2.1reports some statistics,
and Table 2.2 reports tests.
Groups N Mean Std. Deviation
Experiment 1 Question 1 30 4.99 2.41
Experiment 2
Question 1-match 41 3.19 1.96
Question 1-choice 39 3.61 2.51
Table 2.1 Statistics for Questions 1 (matching with prior endowment), 1a (matching
without prior endowment), and 1b (choice list without prior endowment).
Questions Treatment Mean difference t Df. p-Value
1—1-match prior endowment or not 1.81 3.48 69 0.001
1-match—1-choice matching versus choice -0.43 -0.86 78 0.40
Table 2.2 Test of equality of means.
Discussion. Prince confirms the endowment effect.5 Rational or not, it reflects a
genuine property of preference(Brosnan et al. (2012); Korobkin (2003, p. 1244)), not
5See Camerer (1995, p. 666 ff.) and Schmidt & Traub (2009) and its references.
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Figure 2.3 Instructions for cash equivalent with choice list and no prior endowment
(Question 1-choice)
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a bias in measurement.
Prince corrects errors of measurement and, thus, resolves the discrepancy between
choice and matching. Our matching questions are very similar to the choice questions,
directly referring to the choice in the prior envelope held in hand. Accordingly, their
equality is no surprise. Our contribution here is of a methodological nature: we made
matching look like choice, combining the virtues of both.
The test of choice versus matching presented here was between subjects. For
its result, based on a null accepted, to be convincing, statistical power should be
sufficient. It is, because, first, the endowment effect is very significant. Second, in
section 2.4.4 we confirm our finding in a within-subject test for 80 subjects, increasing
power. Several tests reported later confirm the null accepted.
2.4.4 Matching versus choice lists within-subjectss
Questions 2 and 3 replicate Questions 1-match and 1-choice with chocolate (price
e6.25) instead of a mug. Chocolates and mugs were used by Kahneman et al. (1990),
and many follow-up studies. Here we follow suit. Questions 2 and 3 were asked to
each subject, allowing within-subject comparisons. The stimuli are in Web Appendix
WB. The average cash equivalent was 3.31 for matching and 3.26 for the choice list
(t79 = 0.28, p = 0.78), confirming the null hypothesis of equality.
2.4.5 Testing preference reversals
We used Prince to test the classical preference reversal of Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971).
Details are in Web Appendix WA. For Question 4, the choice question, we used an
analog of Figure 4.1 without the description of x. Option 1 was 40.970 (receiving e4
with probability 0.97 and e0 otherwise), called P-bet in the literature because the
gain probability is high. Option 2 was 160.310 called the $-bet because it has a high
minimum possible gain (in dollars when receiving its name; Lichtenstein & Slovic
(1971)). We also measured their cash equivalents in Questions 5 and 6, again using
analogs of Figure 2.2, but without ranges for amount x, writing only “The amount
x varies between the envelopes.” Although in consequence almost nothing is known
about x’s randomness, that affects neither the compatibility nor the transparency of
incentives.
Normal preference reversals (higher CE of the $ bet but, paradoxically, choosing
the P bet) occurred for 11% of the subjects, and the opposite preference reversals
(higher CE of the P bet but choosing the $ bet) happened for 7% of the subjects.
These percentages are not significantly different (p = 0.55) and are infrequent enough
to be explained as random choice inconsistencies (Schmidt & Hey (2004)). We find
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no evidence of genuine preference reversal.
Our finding deviates from other studies of preference reversals, where normal
preference reversals are found in large majorities (surveyed by Seidl (2002)). Prefer-
ence reversals reflect errors in the measurement of preferences (procedural variance)
rather than genuine properties of preferences such as intransitivities (Tversky et al.
(1990)). Prince restores consistency between choice and matching, thus resolving
preference reversals.
2.4.6 Measuring subjective probabilities and ambiguity atti-
tudes
Using questions 7, 8, and 9 we replicate the measurements of subjective probabilities
and ambiguity attitudes by Baillon & Bleichrodt (2011, Study 1). They used classical
choice lists, but we use Prince and matching. Details are in Web Appendix WC. We
measured the probability p such that
10E0 ∼ 10p0, (2.1)
E denotes an event explained as an observation from the Dutch AEX stock index, and
10E0 means that the subject receives e10 if E happens, and nothing otherwise. 10p0
means that the subject received e10 with objective probability p. The probability p
giving the preceding indifference is called the matching probability of event E, denoted
m(E). We measured it for three events:
E = A (Question 7): The Dutch AEX stock index increases or decreases by no
more than 0.5% during the experiment.
E = B (Question 8): The Dutch AEX stock index increases by more than 0.5%
during the experiment.
E = A∪B (Question 9): the AEX stock index decreases by no more than 0.5%
during the experiment.
Our presentation of questions was similar to Figure 2.2, with option 1 being 10E0
and option 2 being 10p0, requesting that a threshold for p (instead of x) be speci-
fied. Baillon and Bleichrodt showed how we can use these observations to analyze
ambiguity attitudes, using a nonadditivity index m(A) + m(B) − m(A ∪ B). We
replicated all their findings. In particular, the nonadditivity index was mostly posi-
tive, rejecting expected utility, and confirming Tversky & Fox (1995) subadditivity
and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) a(mbiguity-generated likelihood)-insensitivity. These
properties are genuine properties of preferences and not artifacts of measurement.
Hence Prince did not remove them. Validity is confirmed because we found the same
phenomena on subjective probabilities as other experimental studies did. Here, as
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Figure 2.4 Tradeoff method indifferences
throughout, the advantage of Prince is that we obtained our results more quickly
(using matching instead of choice) and more precisely than preceding papers did.
2.5 Experiment 3: Prince implemented in an adap-
tive experiment; measuring utility
We use an adaptive method to measure utility and show how Prince can resolve
incentive compatibility problems by ruling out strategic answering. Exact stimuli,
instructions, and details are in Web Appendix WE. We first piloted the following pro-
cedures in two sessions, each with approximately 10 graduate students from ERIM
research institute of Erasmus University. These students had considerable exposure
to decision theory. After the pilot, as an assignment, they were tasked with criticiz-
ing the procedures, especially in ways the experimenter could deceive or manipulate.
They were unsuccessful in their attempts to find weaknesses in the procedures.6
These students, as well as colleagues in informal pilots, confirmed procedural trans-
parency and absence of biases.
We will use Wakker & Deneffe (1996) adaptive tradeoff (TO) method to measure
utility. This method is robust to violations of expected utility and provides a correct
utility function irrespective of whether a subject maximizes expected utility, prospect
theory, or most other nonexpected utility theories. Implementations were as yet not
incentive-compatible, and adding incentive compatibility is our contribution here.
Integrating incentive compatibility makes the method suited for economics.
2.5.1 The preferences to be elicited for the tradeoff method
We measure indifferences rjpg ∼ rj−1p G, j = 1, . . . 4 (Figure 2.4, with the conventional
notation for bets using circles as chance nodes). Consistent with the notation used
in the stimuli of the experiment, superscripts indicate the outcomes rj .
6There were humorous suggestions such as “pull the fire alarm just when you have to pay
e3000.”
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Figure 2.5 The values used for TO0 − TO3; j=1,. . . , 4.
The experimenter chooses some pre-set values 0 < p < 1, G > g > 0 (gauge
outcomes), and r0 > G. Then the bold-printed r1, ...r4 are elicited sequentially from
each subject over four stages. The experiment is adaptive because r1, r2, and r3,
after having been elicited, serve as input to the next question in stages 2, 3, and 4.
We assume a weighted utility model:
for x ≥ y, xpy is evaluated by piU(x) + ρU(y)(pi > 0, ρ > 0) (2.2)
This model includes expected utility, prospect theory for gains Tversky & Kah-
neman (1992), and most other generalizations of expected utility (Wakker (2010,
§7.11)). Algebraic manipulations show that the rjs are equally spaced in utility
units under Eq. 2.2 (Wakker (2010, §4.3, §7.11, §10.6)):
U(r4)− U(r3) = U(r3)− U(r2) = U(r2)− U(r1) = U(r1)− U(r0). (2.3)
A nonparametric measurement of utility results (section 2.5.5, section 2.5.7) that
is valid for virtually all risky choice theories. The observations can be used for
parametric fitting (section 2.5.6, section 2.5.8). The TO method avoids collinearity
between utility U and probability weighting (pi and ρ in Eq. 2.2): Eq. 2.3 is not
affected by the probability weights pi and ρ, and we need not even estimate them.
For other measurements of prospect theory in the literature, collinearity is a serious
problem (demonstrated by Zeisberger et al. (2012, p. 366 ff.)).
We carried out the TO measurement with four sets of pre-determined values,
one training set and three observational sets: TO0 (with tj playing the role of rj , t
means training), TO1 (with xj for rj), TO2 (with yj for rj), and TO3 (with zj for
rj) depicted in Figure 2.5.Wakker & Deneffe (1996) used the same stimuli but scaled
up and choices were hypothetical.
The Figure 2.6 displays the first two questions, TO1.1 and TO1.2, of the TO1
quadruple, as presented to the subjects. Question TO1.2 immediately followed TO1.1
on a separate page. Not only is the experiment adaptive, but also it is obviously so
to subjects. Each subjects had to impute the answer they gave to the first question
x1(= r1) before answering the next question (determining r2). The third and fourth
questions were like the second, requesting information of the previous answer.
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Figure 2.6 Figures used in the tradeoff method.
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2.5.2 Procedure and real incentives
We used Prince in two one-hour, pen and paper sessions (25 and 55 subjects) with
performance-contingent incentives. Subjects were undergraduate students of Eras-
mus University in Rotterdam who were enrolled in an economics class. They received
a e5 show-up fee in addition to their performance-based payoff. They first chose a
sealed envelope with their RCS. Then they received written instructions, accompa-
nied by an explanatory PowerPoint presentation.
Subjects filled out the training questions of TO0, jointly and simultaneously,
exactly as in Wakker & Deneffe (1996), guided by the PowerPoint presentation.
Subjects wrote their answers on pp. TO0.1-TO0.3, which they kept, but also on the
front page TO0.0, which they tore off and gave to the experimenter at the end of
the experiment. We explained how the performance payment procedure worked, and
how subjects’ answers to the questionnaire would operationalize the selection from the
RCS in their envelope. Only then did subjects receive the three sets of questions TO1,
TO2, TO3 (ordered randomly, subject-dependent), which they completed at their
own pace. Three subjects in the first group, and six in the second, were randomly
selected for real play at the end.
2.5.3 Construction and use of envelopes for real incentives,
and avoiding the two overlap problems
In preparation for each session, we constructed 100 envelopes, from which each sub-
ject would randomly choose one (without replacement). Each envelope contained a
slip with two bets written on it (the RCS). We used popular theories of risky choice,
mostly expected value and prospect theory, and pilot studies to determine the con-
tents of the envelopes that minimize both overlap problems. Because the details
depend on particularities of the experiment, we present them in Appendix A.
2.5.4 Experiment with hypothetical choice
We did two sessions (10 and 44 subjects) with hypothetical choice. Subjects were
unaware that other subjects played for real incentives. There was no role for Prince
techniques here, as no incentives needed explaining or implementing. We only de-
scribe the differences with the incentivized experiment. Subjects received e10 for
participation. They made less on average than the real incentive condition but the
session took less time. The results that follow concern the incentivized sessions,
unless stated otherwise.
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2.5.5 Non-parametric analysis
An advantage of the TO method is that we can infer the utility function nonparamet-
rically, i.e., without a commitment to any family or shape of utility functions (Wakker
(2010, §9.4.2)), using Eq. 2.3. Figure 2.7 will present utility graphs generated by
average answers.
To develop a nonparametric test of concavity, note that for strictly concave utility
we have (with r = x, y, or z, respectively)
ri+2 − ri+1 > ri+1 − ri (2.4)
for all i, and for strictly convex utility we have
ri+2 − ri+1 < ri+1 − ri (2.5)
for all i.
We classified a subject’s utility as concave if Eq. 2.4 was satisfied more often than
Eq. 2.5, and as convex if the opposite held, with Eq. 2.5 satisfied more often than
Eq. 2.4. The remaining subjects were irregular or linear.
2.5.6 Parametric analysis
Whereas the TO method allows nonparametric utility analyses, it can also be used
for parametric analyses. We used Eq. 2.2 with the two most common parametric
utility families, CARA (constant absolute risk aversion, or linear-exponential) and
CRRA (constant relative risk aversion, or log-power) utility. They are defined as
follows.
CARA utility :
for α > 0, U(r) = 1− e−αr; (2.6)
for α = 0, U(r) = r; (2.7)
for α < 0, U(r) = e−αr − 1. (2.8)
CRRA utility :
for ρ > 0, U(r) = rρ; (2.9)
for ρ = 0, U(r) = ln(r); (2.10)
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for ρ < 0, U(r) = −rρ. (2.11)
We used Eq. 2.3 as the basis of our parametric analysis, rewriting it as
rj = U−1(2U(rj−1)− U(rj−2)) for j = 2, 3, 4. (2.12)
We assumed a Fechnerian error model with the error term directly imposed on
the answers rj that subjects produced:
rj = U−1(2U(rj−1)− U(rj−2)) + R for j = 2, 3, 4. (2.13)
We chose to impose error terms upon the direct measured values, being rj 2.12,
rather than upon utilities as often done in the literature. Our error model is similar
to Wilcox (2011) contextual approach. The error term R has expectation 0 and
standard deviaton δ > 0 per e. That is, δ is to be interpreted as the standard
deviation when differences rj − rj−1 are in the order of magnitude of e1. Our error
model is thus close to the thinking process of subjects, because the TO method
enhances the direct comparison of rj − rj−1 during the experiment. Given that
xj−xj−1 = 4.5 under expected value maximization, we chose the standard deviation
x for r
j = xj equal to 4.5δ. We similarly used expected value approximations to set
y = 13δ and z = 40δ. We estimate δ and the utility parameter so as to maximize
likelihood.
2.5.7 Results of the non-parametric analysis
As regards the overlap problems of section 2.2.2, for eight out of the nine envelopes
opened during our experiment, the questionnaire answers determined the choice from
the envelope, which was implemented. For the indeterminate case, the subject choose
on the spot.
Figure 2.7 depicts the utility graphs resulting from average answers to the x, y,
and z questions, based on Eq. 2.3, with utility normalized to be 0 at outcomes x0,
y0, and z0, and to be 1 at x4, y4, and z4. Note that these graphs do not involve
any parametric assumption. They can also be produced for every individual. We
can use overlaps of the x, y, and z regions to combine such curves into one overall
curve. As one would expect from the overall concavity of curves in Figure 2.7, most
participants exhibit concave utility (Eq. 2.4) versus convexity over outcomes (Eq.
2.5): 37 versus 13 for the x’s, 29 versus 12for the y’s, and 21 versus 14 for the z’s.
This is significant for both x and y (p ≤ 0.01). Thus our findings confirm concavity
of utility, although the concavity is not pronounced. For the x’s, about 20% of our
subjects had equality for all i in Eqs. 2.4 and 2.5, giving perfectly linear utility and
the same held for the y’s and z’s. The subjects not classified exhibited irregular (or
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Figure 2.7 Nonparametric utility curves for the TO method.
linear with noise) utilities. The hypothetical choice groups’ results were in line, but
with more concavity for x and y stimuli, and not for z stimuli, than for incentivized
groups.
2.5.8 Results of the parametric analysis
Our main analysis is at the individual level, finding the best utility parameter and
error variance for all observations xj , yj , and zj simultaneously. Normal distributions
of the parameters are rejected and, hence, we report medians, Wilcoxon signed rank,
Mann-Whitney, and Kruskal-Wallis tests.
The median CARA parameter α is 0.0001 (more precisely, α = 0.000099), yielding
risk tolerance 1/α =e10000. It suggests concave utility, but the value is not signifi-
cantly different from linearity (α = 0). The median power ρ is 0.96, again suggesting
weak concavity but not deviating significantly from linearity (ρ = 1).
The standard deviation δ is larger for CARA utility than for CRRA utility (p
= 0.001).7 Thus CRRA utility better fits the data than CARA utility. We also
fitted parameters to the x stimuli, y stimuli, and z stimuli separately, and compared
them. Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal that CARA’s α marginally depends on x, y, and
z (p = 0.09), being higher for x than for y stimuli (p = 0.03), marginally higher for
x than for z stimuli (p = 0.09), and not different between y and z stimuli. These
results confirm the commonly assumed decreasing absolute risk aversion (references
in Wakker (2010, p. 83)). A reason that we find no differences for the z stimuli
may be because the z stimuli, while at higher levels of wealth, also involve bigger
differences, which in itself will enhance risk aversion. CRRA’s ρ does depend on x, y,
and z (p = 0.01), being smaller for the x than for the y and z stimuli (p ≤ 0.01), and
7Their medians happen to be the same (0.88), due to different skewnesses. Note that the
standard deviations have the same unit (1 per e) and, hence, can be compared.
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not different between the y and z stimuli. This finding implies decreasing relative risk
aversion. Although most authors have conjectured increasing, rather than decreasing
relative risk aversion, several studies found the opposite (Gollier (2001, §4); Ogaki &
Zhang (2001)) and no consensus has been reached on this point.
Our findings comparing incentivized and hypothetical choices agree with common
findings. The hypothetical data were noisier and contained more outliers. Further:
(1) There was some more risk seeking for hypothetical choice than for real incentives
in the z stimuli, reaching marginal significance (0.05 < p < 0.10) both for CARA and
CRRA utility. (2) No significant differences were found in risk attitudes or standard
deviations of parameters.
2.5.9 Discussion of the adaptive utility measurement
As regards the problem of strategic answering in adaptive experiments, Toubia et al.
(2013, p. 629) and Wang et al. (2010) provide suggestions alternative to ours for
mitigating this problem. One of these suggestions, deriving a preference functional
from the experimental answers and implementing this functional in the RCS, was
implemented by Ding (2007). Then subjects cannot directly understand the effects
of their answers on the RCS during the experiment, and have to trust the relevance
of the derived functional.
In experiments where subjects cannot really influence stimuli, they may mistak-
enly think they can, e.g. due to magical thinking (Rothbart & Snyder (1970)) or
illusions of control (Stefan & David (2013)). Such distortions are more likely with
future than with past uncertainties. Thus Prince helps to avoid such distortions.
By classical economic standards it may be surprising that we find near-linear
utility, whereas classical estimates, based on expected utility, usually find more con-
cavity. Recent studies find that risk aversion is mostly generated by factors other
than utility for the moderate stakes considered in our experiment. With these fac-
tors filtered out, as in Eq. 2.3, utility turns out to be almost linear. Epper et al.
(2011) who, like us, corrected for deviations from expected utility, argued for the
reasonableness of this finding.
Unlike most measurements of utility in the literature, our analysis does not need
to correct for deviations from expected utility. The TO stimuli were carefully devised
such that those deviations have no bearing on our analysis, giving the same Eq. 2.3
under expected utility and nonexpected utility. The deviations are avoided rather
than corrected for. This further supports our claim of high internal and external
validity for our utility findings.
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2.6 Parts and ingredients of Prince used in
preceding studies
Virtually all choice experiments using the RIS randomly select the RCS at the con-
clusion of the experiment, thus violating our Principle 1 (priority), and then also 2
(tangibility) and mostly 4 (concreteness). All (to our knowledge) violate Principle 5
(instructions). Many usually satisfy Principle 3 (wholeness), randomly selecting, for
instance, a row in a choice list, which constitutes the whole choice situation. Virtu-
ally all matching experiments (mostly using BDM) similarly violate Principles 1, 2,
4, and 5, and none that we know of satisfy Principle 3. The remainder of this section
focuses on studies satisfying Principle 1.
To our knowledge, Bardsley (2000) was the first to satisfy Principle 1.8 His pur-
pose was to implement lying without lying, so to say. Bardsley could not determine
the choice options in the RCS for a given subject beforehand because the latter de-
pended on choices made by other subjects during the experiment. Thus Bardsley
could not satisfy our Principles 3-5. He did not satisfy Principle 2 (tangibility) either
but recommended it for future studies (last para of his §7).
In Schade et al. (2012, first version 2001), options were determined a priori
in an envelope (lying on a desk in the front of the room), but not whole choice
situations. What was real (sculpture/painting) was determined only at the end of
the experiment, and with a small probability. Hence Principle 1 was satisfied, and
Principle 2 was approximately, but Principles 3-5 were not. Wang et al. (2007) also
used Schade, Kunreuther, & Koellinger’s (2012) design, referring to Schade et al.’s
(2001) working paper.
Bohnet et al. (2008) determined the RCS a priori. One choice option was inserted
in an envelope that was visibly posted on a blackboard while subjects answered the
experimental questions. Thus Principle 1 is satisfied, and Principle 2 is approximately
so. Principles 3-4 were not satisfied. The authors first asked subjects what subjects
would ”pick,” but later formulated these as instructions to the experimenters, thus
partly satisfying Principle 5. Hao & Houser (2012) satisfy our Principles 1 and 2.
They also used a formulation in the spirit of Principle 5. However, to optimize
other goals in their research, they deviate from Principles 3-4. They present a meta-
8The first experiment with a prior envelope may have occurred earlier, by Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe (January 16, 1797, letter cited by Mandelkow (8 ed, p. 254)). Goether wrote: “I am inclined
to offer Mr. Vieweg from Berlin an epic poem, Hermann and Dorothea . . . Concerning the royalty
we will proceed as follows: I will hand over to Mr. Counsel Bo¨ttiger a sealed note which contains
my demand, and I wait for what Mr. Vieweg will suggest to offer for my work. If his offer is lower
than my demand, then I take my note back, unopened, and the negotiation is broken. If, however,
his offer is higher, then I will not ask for more than what is written in the note to be opened by
Mr. Bo¨ttiger”. We thank Uyanga Turmunkh for this citation.
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lottery B before explaining choices, then present a single strategy-choice between
meta-lotteries, explicitly deviating from isolated binary choices.
Bleichrodt et al. (2013) considered case-based decision theory. Their questions
concern varying memories for the same two choice options, rather than varying choice
options as in classical revealed-preference experiments. They used Bardsley’s (2000)
method, satisfying Principles 1-2. They did not satisfy Principles 3-5. Their ex-
periment was adaptive, but such that the two overlap problems (indeterminacy and
exclusion) did not arise, thus avoiding strategic behavior.
In Camerer (1989), subjects, when selected for real play, could choose their pre-
ferred option only then, on the spot. We did the same but only in the special cases
where the experimental choices did not specify the choice in the RCS, which can
happen in adaptive experiments. Camerer’s experiment contained no adaptive ques-
tions, and he offered the ex-post choice to all subjects, thus testing isolation. His test
involved revising choices, which entailed a slight deviation from the prior announce-
ment that experimental choices would be outcome relevant, involving a mild form of
deception.
2.7 General discussion
The principles of Prince listed in section 2.2.3, and in general every detail of Prince,
serve to enhance isolation by enhancing psychological conditioning upon the RCS.
Although Starmer & Sugden (1991) found isolation satisfied in the RIS, violations
have been found. In fact, any finding of learning, order effect, or spillover effect (Cox
et al. (2014)) entails a violation of isolation. Hence improvements of isolation are
desirable.
Regarding Principle 1 (priority), many studies show that conditioning works bet-
ter for events determined in the past, even if yet uncertain, than for events to be
determined in the future.9 In the case of future determination, a meta-lottery is re-
alistically perceived because the situation is still unsolved. More generally, we want
9See Bardsley et al. (2010, p. 277), Cubitt et al. (1998b), Cubitt et al. (1998a), Hey & Lee
(2005), and Shafir & Tversky (1992, p. 463). In Bardsley et al.’s (2010) terminology, Prince uses
the direct decision approach and avoids the strategy method. TThat the timing of the resolution
of uncertainty, even if of no strategic or informational relevance, still affects subjects, has been
demonstrated in many studies (Bosman & Van Winden (2010); Halevy (2007); Kreps & Porteus
(1979)), and plays a role in time inconsistencies. In particular, prediction and postdiction are
perceived differently (Brun & Teigen (1990); Heath & Tversky (1991); Rothbart & Snyder (1970)).
Importantly for Prince, people more readily condition on uncertainties determined in the past than
in the future, and take future uncertainty more as a meta-lottery (Keren (1991)). This phenomenon
underlies several findings in game theory (Weber et al. (2004): virtual observability). Techniques
for enhancing conditional isolated thinking are commonly used in insurance and marketing. For
instance, pseudo-certainty is generated by making clients ignore background risks and exceptions to
reimbursements (Tversky & Kahneman (1981, p. 456)).
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the RCS to be felt as realistically as possible.
There have been several implementations of real incentives using prior envelopes
(section 2.6) after Bardsley (2000), but all describe only one choice option in the
envelope. If the randomization concerns the whole choice situation as with Prince
(Principle 3), then subjects immediately condition on it, serving isolation. BDM ran-
domizes a choice option (the price) rather than the choice situation, leading subjects
to condition the wrong way. It obfuscates the choice situation, with the random price
draw enhancing the undesirable perception of meta-lotteries. Principle 3 (wholeness)
is crucial for Prince.
Researchers in decision theory will immediately see that Prince is strategically
equivalent to RIS, asking for real preferences. Homo ecnomomicus will behave the
same in both procedures. However, as Bardsley et al. (2010, pp. 270-271) wrote:
“the effects of incentive mechanisms can depend on features of their implementation
which are irrelevant from a conventional choice-theoretical point of view.” Prince
minimizes the biases generated by those features. It targets homo sapiens.
Throughout the history of preference measurement, there have been discussions
of the pros and cons of matching versus choice.10 Choice is less precise. It takes more
time to elicit preferences, requires a specification of range and initial values which
generates biases, and it enhances the use of qualitative noncompensatory heuristics
(lexicographic choice and misperception of dominance). Matching is harder for sub-
jects to understand, as are its incentive compatible implementations. Further, the
matching environment can lead subjects to ignore qualitative information and to
resort to inappropriate arithmetical operations.
Prince avoids an important misperception of matching: subjects may misperceive
matching as bargaining.11 In Prince, with the choice situation (the price therein
being one option) specified beforehand in an envelope held in hand, it is perfectly
obvious that this price is not subject to bargaining or any other influence.
Several experimental economists have implemented more than one choice situation
for real, which is acceptable if the distortions due to the income effect are smaller
than other distortions.12 A systematic study is Cox et al. (2011), which is close in
spirit to our study in seeking to reduce distortions in the RIS. It considers alternative
10These discussions include Bostic et al. (1990), Noussair et al. (2004), and Poulton (1989).
There is also extensive literature in the health domain (Stevens et al. (2007); Weinstein et al.
(1996a)) and psychophysics (Gescheider (1997, Ch. 3).)
11Because the link to the RCS is not clear in classical implementations, subjects think of what
is closest from their everyday life, and this is probably bargaining. See Engelmann, & Hollard’s
(2010, trade uncertainty), Korobkin (2003, p. 1234), and Sayman & O¨ncu¨ler (2005, §2.2); also see
Bardsley et al. (2010, p. 273).
12Repeated payment is common in game and market experiments. In individual choice it is not
very common, but still has been used in several studies, including Epper et al. (2011), and Mosteller
& Nogee (2006).
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incentive systems that imply particular income effects, and investigates circumstances
in which these income effects generate smaller distortions than the regular RIS does.
Our study seeks to improve the RIS while avoiding any income effect, thus preserving
incentive compatibility for homo economicus, rather than replacing RIS by another
system with some income effect.
Our claims of the high quality of Prince preference measurements are based on the
theoretical arguments underlying Prince, exceptionally high consistency of our data
(only one of 119 choice lists was inconsistent), debriefings and discussions in pilots,
and confirmation of all well-established preference findings. Comparisons with gold
standards of true preference would be desirable, but there are no gold standards here.
Further supporting the quality of data by showing out-of-sample predictive power,
especially regarding real-life decisions, extensive consistency checks to assess noise
separated from between-individual and between-stimuli variation, manipulations of
Prince with separate principles turned on and off, and comparisons with existing
preference measurements are also desirable. Given the size of this paper, we prefer
to leave such tests to future studies.
A drawback of Prince is that its implementation may take more preparation time:
Numbered envelopes with different choice situations have to be prepared for every
session of an experiment.
2.8 Conclusion
The prior incentive system (Prince) is an improvement of the random incentive sys-
tem, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak system, and Bardsley’s (2000) conditional infor-
mation system. Prince improves measurements of preferences without affecting those
preferences themselves. Our subjects understand that there is only one real choice
situation: the one they hold in hand. Prince resolves a number of problems: (a)
violations of isolation; (b) misperceptions of bargaining; (c) strategic answering in
adaptive experiments. Incentive compatability is completely transparent to subjects.
Hence there were virtually no irrational preference switches in choice lists.
Prince reconciles choice and matching, combining the efficiency and precision of
matching with an improved clarity and validity of choice. This resolves the classical
preference reversals and reinvents matching. Prince corrects the major mistake of
BDM: to randomize choice options rather than choice situations. Thus Prince leads
subjects to condition properly. Prince provides more valid and transparent measure-
ments of preferences, including WTA, subjective probabilities (section 2.4.6), and
utilities (section 2.5), and ambiguity attitudes (section 2.4.6). The endowment effect
and nonadditivity of subjective probabilities are genuine properties of preferences,
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entailing genuine deviations from classical principles. As with aversion to ambiguity,
insensitivity is also real, and plays a role. Preference reversals, to the contrary, are
due to errors in measurements. Utility is closer to linear than commonly thought,
and decreasing absolute risk aversion is confirmed.
Every incentivized experimental measurement of preference or value can be im-
proved using Prince. Prince sheds new light on which phenomena are to be incorpo-
rated in behavioral models.
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2.A Appendix: Procedures for the TO
measurement
The x stimuli contain an outcome 0, at which utility is −∞ for ρ ≤ 0. Because this
outcome cancels from the equations, we still allow for power ρ ≤ 0 in our data fitting.
Only five subjects had ρ ≤ 0 (minimum -0.75), and they do not affect any result.
Preceding studies and real incentives
Wakker & Deneffe (1996) introduced the TO method. If real incentives are imple-
mented using the traditional BDM method and RIS, then subjects can obviously
answer strategically and may rationally overstate the values of r1, r2, and r3. Hence
most experiments using the method were hypothetical. Four exceptions are Abdel-
laoui (2000), Bleichrodt et al. (2010), Schunk & Betsch (2006), and van de Kuilen &
Wakker (2011) where the RIS was used with real incentives but subjects apparently
did not notice the chance to answer strategically. The latter study used a strategy-
check question to verify so (end of their §4). Toubia et al. (2013) also used the RIS
in an adaptive experiment, but here it was, unlike with the TO method, impossible
for subjects to notice the possibility to answer strategically.
We use Prince to implement real incentives. Then the RCS has been randomly
selected for each subject before decision making. Subjects possess the RCS but with
details remaining unknown. Subjects then obviously do not have any opportunity
to influence the RCS and, furthermore, this is perfectly clear to them. Wang et al.
(2007, p. 203) pointed out that providing the RCS prior to the experiment also rules
out any illusion of strategic answering in a nonadaptive experiment.
Construction and use of envelopes for real incentives
For the 100 envelopes constructed before the experiment, we chose 12 types of en-
velopes, one for each question from TO1.1 - TO3.4. The envelope of type TOi.j (i
= 1-3; j = 1-4) contains the two bets of Question TOi,j with values substituted as
indicated in Table 2.3. The values x0 = x0 = 18, y0 = y0 = 18 and z0 = z0 = 210
are as in Figure 2.5. For example, the envelopes of type TO1.2 results from Figure
2.6b and contains the bets 32 2
3
0 and 27 2
3
9 . The only exception is type TO3.4, which
contains z3′ = 3050 instead of z3 = 342 for r3. The # numbers in Table 2.3 indicate
how many of the 100 envelopes were of the particular type. For example, there were
three envelopes of type TO1.2.
The stimuli of TO1 were used by Abdellaoui (2000) and those of TO2 were used
by Booij et al. (2010), both scaled up. Those of TO3 were not used before. They
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j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4
TO1x1 = 23 for x1 (#33)x2 = 27 for x2 (#3) x3 = 32 for x3 (#3) x4 = 36 for x4 (#3)
TO2y1 = 46 for y1 (#33)y2 = 69 for y2 (#3) y3 = 92 for y3 (#3) y4 = 116 for y4 (#3)
TO3z1 = 253 for z1 (#9) z2 = 297 for z2 (#3)z3 = 342 for z3 (#3)z4 = 3100 for z4 (#1)
* In this choice question (Figure 2.5, TO3, j = 4), we used z3′ = 3050 (instead
of z3 = 342) for z3.
Table 2.3 The pre-set TO values
serve to study high outcomes.
Subjects were informed that: (a) at least one of every ten of them would play
for real; (b) if playing for real, the average gain under random (“blind”) choosing is
53.27; (c) at least one prize exceeded 3000. They were told that the types of envelope
did not occur equally often, which should be obvious with 100 envelopes of 12 types.
In other respects the organization was as with the Prince experiments reported
before. For example, the questionnaire asked subjects to give us instructions about
which option from their own envelope to give them at the end of the experiment. One
more difference was as follows. In the previous experiments we demonstrated how
Prince can be used with a regular performance-contingent real payment for every
subject. We now implement Prince with performance-contingent real payments only
for some subjects, but then having these payments large. Abdellaoui et al. (2011,
Web Appendix) suggested that such payment schemes work best to motivate subjects.
For this purpose, at the end we collected the three front pages numbered TOj.0 of
each subject that contained their answers, whereas the subjects kept the rest of their
questionnaires that also contained their answers.13 The front pages of each subject
were folded together so as to be unrecognizable, and were put in an opaque case and
shuffled. Then we let one subject draw some (three in the first session and six in
the second) triples of questionnaires from this case, after which the corresponding
subjects played for real.
Maximizing overlap with experimental questions
The numbers xj for TO1 in Table 2.3 result from expected value maximization,
and those for TO2 and TO3 (except TO3.4) result from Tversky & Kahneman’s
(1992) prospect theory and their parameters. We rounded the xjs. We obviously
constructed the 100 envelopes, in particular the frequency of each type of envelope
among the 100 envelopes. so as to generate an appropriate overall expected value of
the game for the subjects.
13The subjects filled out all answers twice: once on the page containing the question, and once
on the front page numbered TOj.0.
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We chose most envelopes of type TOj.1 because here three rather than two out-
comes were known beforehand. Hence, each answer x1 by the subject implied a
choice from the corresponding envelope, depending on whether x1 exceeded the cor-
responding value from the envelope or not.14 The same observations hold for y1 and
z1. We thus obtain a high overlap between experimental answers and RCSs.
In the explanations given at the beginning of the experiment an example was
used that occurred in a pilot: In TO1.1 a subject in a pilot had answered x1 = 50,
implying an indifference 10 1
2
8 ∼ 50 1
2
1 . Then, if the choice in the envelope had
been between 10 1
2
8 and 32 1
2
1, the former, 10 1
2
8, would be given to the subject. We
explained that the subject’s preference would only be reinforced if outcome 10 in his
preferred bet had been increased to 24, and he would obviously want the former even
more from the pair {24 1
2
8, 32 1
2
1}. This pair was actually contained in the envelope
of this subject, who indeed received 24 1
2
8. In general, if the value rj in the envelope
exceeded the answer rj given by the subject and the value ji−1 in the envelope was
below rji−1(reinforcing the preference), then we would give the bet with outcome rj
to the subject. Conversely, if the value rj in the envelope was below the answer rj
given by the subject and the value ji−1 in the envelope exceeded ji−1 (reinforcing the
preference), then we would give the lottery with outcome rj−1 to the subject. Thus
the answers given during the experiment pertained to many possible envelopes, as
we explained to the subjects.
Verifiable absence of deception
As in the previous experiments, subjects could verify that there was no deception.
Again, at the beginning they verified, through sets of 10 numbered envelopes, that all
numbered envelopes were present. Subjects collected, shuffled, and selected envelopes
from bags themselves. At the end, when subjects who had been selected for payment
came to the front of the room, a list describing the content of all 100 envelopes was
handed out to the other subjects, with calculations showing that our information
about expected value under random play and maximal amounts was correct. These
subjects were asked to open their envelope and verify that the list correctly described
its content. For the subjects who were in front of the class, everyone in the class could
see that the description of their envelopes was correct.
One of the experimenters carried over e3000 in cash with him, showing to the
subjects that this amount could and would be paid on the spot if the lucky case
arose. The random selection of at least one per 10 subjects to play for real (three
out of 25 in the first session and 6 out of 55 in the second) was done by letting the
14If indifference, subjects could choose on the spot, as always if the experimental answers did
not specify a choice.
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subjects put their questionnaires in an opaque bag, after which the questionnaires
to be implemented for real were randomly selected by a subject. Lotteries were
generated using a six-sided die, thrown by a subject selected for this role by the
subject who was playing for real.
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The Rich Domain of
Ambiguity Explored1
3.1 Introduction
This paper experimentally measures ambiguity attitudes for different sources of un-
certainty, different outcomes, and their combinations. We thus provide the first
systematic study of these dependencies, and comparisons between them. In par-
ticular, we investigate the following (not-exclusive) topics of debate in the current
literature: (1) Does ambiguity attitude depend on the source of uncertainty (source-
dependence)? (2) Is ambiguity attitude better captured by outcome functions out-
comes, or by event functions? (3) To what extent is ambiguity aversion universal?
(4) Are the findings of the widely studied Ellsberg urns representative for natural
uncertainties, or are they due to particular negative emotions with little general va-
lidity? These questions lead to more fundamental questions: (5) Is there a general
ambiguity attitude, reflecting an attitude towards probabilities being unknown, or are
ambiguity attitudes driven by context-dependent emotions generated by the uncer-
tain events considered? (6) Can deviations from Savage’s (1954) subjective expected
utility, as in the modern ambiguity models, be rational?
Following up on a positive answer to the first question, we also investigate which
parametric families of (subjective-)probability transformation functions are best suited
to capture ambiguity attitudes and their variations. The related question has been
studied extensively for risk, but we are the first to investigate it for ambiguity. Hey
et al. (2010) were the first to systematically test many ambiguity theories, consid-
1This chapter is based on the paper “The Rich Domain of Ambiguity Explored” co-authored
with Julia Mu¨ller, Tong Wang and Peter P. Wakker.
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ering an ambiguity triangle domain with a bingo blower as source of uncertainty.
Kothiyala et al. (2012) supplemented their study. Our paper is a follow-up study,
focusing on the winner of the above comparisons - prospect theory with the source
method - and testing which submodel best captures variations in ambiguity attitudes
in a richer domain.
3.2 Two topics of debate
This section provides literature and background on two topics of debate investigated
in this paper.
3.2.1 Ambiguity through outcome-functions in the smooth
model
Ellsberg (1961) initiated the study of ambiguity, where decisions under uncertainty
have to be made without knowledge of underlying probabilities. One current topic of
debate is whether ambiguity attitudes are better modeled through outcome functions
or event functions. Most decision models use event functions, generalizing subjective
probabilities.2 They involve generalizations of integrals in their definitions, and they
allow for kinks in indifference curves.
Recently, alternative models, using outcome functions, became popular. We start
with the clearest model of this kind: source-dependent expected utility by Chew et al.
(2008). Here expected utility holds within each source of uncertainty, but different
sources may involve different utility functions. Ambiguity aversion is captured by
utility being more concave for ambiguous sources than for risky sources. Thus an
outcome function (utility) is used to model ambiguity attitudes, and the ambiguity
attitude depends not only on the source of uncertainty but also on the range of
outcomes considered.
The most popular outcome-based model is the smooth model by Klibanoff et al.
(2005), which we next discuss in some detail.3 In the smooth model, uncertainty
about the true (risky) probability measure on the state space is expressed by a second-
stage probability measure. With respect to first-stage probabilities, expected utility
is maximized. In the second stage, backward induction is used and again expected
utility is maximized, but a concave transformation ϕ is applied to risky expected
2See Gajdos et al. (2008), Ghirardato et al. (2004), Gilboa (1987), Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989),
Hansen & Sargent (2001), Jaffray(1989, 1994), Schmeidler (1989), Tversky & Kahneman (1992),
Wakker (2010). Recent generalizations include Chateauneuf & Faro (2009) and Maccheroni et al.
(2006), with Strzalecki (2011) connecting event- and outcome-based models.
3models and generalizations include Chew et al. (2008), Dobbs (1991), Ergin & Gul (2009),
Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p. 30 ff.), Nau (2006b), Neilson (2010), and Seo (2009).
49_Erim BW Li_stand.job
3.2. Two topics of debate 39
utility, generating ambiguity aversion. A big pro of the smooth model is its analytical
tractability, using only conventional integrals and having no kinks in preferences, so
that traditional optimization techniques can readily be used. Ambiguity attitudes
are different for different outcome domains with different utility curvature.
An empirical difficulty of outcome-function models is that ambiguity attitudes
cannot change if we go from likely to unlikely gain-events whereas empirically they
do, changing from ambiguity averse to ambiguity seeking. Another empirical diffi-
culty is that these models assume expected utility for risk, which is needed for their
tractability, but which is violated empirically (Allais (1953); Kahneman & Tversky
(1979); Starmer (2000)).
In the smooth model, utility could be different for different sources of uncertainty,
capturing source dependence of ambiguity attitudes, in the same way as it is different
for the (risky) first stage than for the ambiguous second stage. Whereas such source
dependence can be investigated empirically, it was not the intention of the inventors
of the smooth model. They assumed a Savage state space in the first stage, which
captures all uncertainties. This means that their utility transformation ϕ applies to
all sources of uncertainty, and then cannot capture source dependence. It should
capture the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker and should apply to all sources
of ambiguity. The smooth model can differentiate between different uncertain sources
through different second-stage probability distributions, which are assumed to cap-
ture the ambiguity in events and to be endogenous. To the best of our knowledge, this
endogenous aspect of the smooth model has not yet been investigated. Applications
of the smooth model have taken the two-stage decomposition as exogenous, deter-
mined by the researcher. Source dependence of ambiguity aversion may possibly be
captured through different dispersions of the two-stage probability decompositions,
but such dispersions cannot capture insensitivity nor its source dependence. Given
that there are many two-stage decompositions, and that this subjective parameter of
the smooth model is of a high dimensionality, its analysis will be a complex topic of
future research, and we will not discuss it further.
3.2.2 External validity of Ellsberg urns
Another point of debate in the current literature concerns the relevance of the Ells-
berg urn events for general uncertainty. These events have been the by far most used
events to study ambiguity in the literature up to today. Several authors have argued
for broadening the domain of study. In our everyday decisions, we almost never know
probabilities of the uncertain events faced, but these uncertainties come naturally,
and not through information deliberately concealed as with the ambiguous Ellsberg
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urn. This urn will, unlike the known urn, generate negative social emotions (Tversky
& Fox (1995)). Hence, natural uncertainties deserve closer examination. In a review
paper of over 20 years ago, Camerer & Weber (1992) wrote: “There are diminish-
ing returns to studying urns.” The same view motivated the work on ambiguity by
Amos Tversky. He often emphasized the importance of source dependence (Heath
& Tversky (1991); Tversky & Kahneman (1992); Tversky & Fox (1995); Tversky &
Wakker (1995)).
Many other recent studies have casted further doubts on the general validity of
the phenomena found for Ellsberg urns (reviewed by Trautmann & Van De Kuilen
(2013)). To clarify the role of emotions generated by particularities of events, we will
add two sources of uncertainty. The first concerns the district of origin of a child in
charity schooling in India. While there still is concealed information differentiating
the ambiguous events (now about districts) from unambiguous events as with Ells-
berg urns, this case will generate additional positive social (“feel-good”) emotions.
Those will counterbalance the negative emotions about the concealed information.
The second additional source that we consider concerns health and will not gener-
ate asymmetric emotions. Unlike with the other sources, there is no information
deliberately concealed by us and differentiating the ambiguous from the unambigu-
ous events. This example will be more characteristic of natural uncertainties and
ambiguities.
3.3 Our analysis of ambiguity
Our analysis is based on binary rank-dependent utility (binary RDU), and its speci-
fication in Abdellaoui et al. (2011) source method. Binary RDU specifies evaluations
of two-outcome prospects, and comprises many ambiguity theories including multi-
ple priors, α maxmin, prospect theory, and Choquet expected utility Wakker (2010,
§10.6). Thus our analysis is valid for all these theories. We will use the simplified
implementation of the source method introduced by Dimmock et al. (2012). Those
authors deliberately minimized the number of measurements and the experimental
time per subject so as to demonstrate the tractability of their method. We will use
more detailed and thorough measurements and more time per subject so as to obtain
better reliability and validity.
The three sources of uncertainty that we consider are: (1) which of 10 possible
colors a ball drawn from an Ellsberg urn has; (2) which of 10 possible viruses caused
a disease; (3) which of 10 possible districts a child from India came from. We will
also consider three kinds of outcomes: money, waiting time, and life duration.
Subjects consider gambles αEβ on events E, yielding a favorable outcome α if
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event E happens and an unfavorable outcome β otherwise. We explain how we
measured ambiguity indexes for the Ellsberg urn. For the other two sources it was
done the same way. We considered events Ej of j winning colors for j = 1, 3, 5, 7, and
9, where higher j’s give more favorable events. We call j/10 the Bayes-probability of
event Ej , because a Bayesian decision maker would assign this subjective probability
to event Ej . For each event Ej we determined the matching probability m(j/10),
being the objective probability such that a subject considered gaining α under event
Ej equivalent to gaining α with this objective probability m(j/10). The function m
depends on the source of uncertainty, which can be expressed by adding the subscript
in mso.
For all sources, subjects had the same information about all events Ej , and they
had no reason to consider any event Ei preferable to any other event Ej .
4 Hence an
ambiguity neutral (Bayesian) decision maker assigns subjective probability j/10 to
each event Ej and has m(j/10) = j/10 for all j. For each event Ej , j/10 - m(j/10)
serves as event-dependent ambiguity aversion index, and we have:
j/10−m(j/10) > 0 : ambiguity aversion forEj ; (3.1)
j/10−m(j/10) = 0 : ambiguity neutrality for Ej ; (3.2)
j/10−m(j/10) < 0 : ambiguity seeking for Ej ; (3.3)
For example, ambiguity averse subjects dislike the ambiguity comprised in Ej and a
smaller objective probability m(j/10) will then be equivalent to Ej , implying Eq. 3.1.
Thus the matching probabilities m(j/10) provide an easy tool to measure ambiguity
attitudes. Dimmock et al. (2012) give theoretical justifications for this claim, show-
ing that matching probabilities easily and completely capture ambiguity attitudes
for binary RDU and all theories comprised by it. DKW derived global indexes of
ambiguity attitudes as follows. First, for the five data points (j/10, m(j/10)) the
best-fitting (by quadratic distance) line
p 7−→ c+ sp; (3.4)
(truncated at 0 and 1; i.e., it should not be negative or exceed 1) is determined.
We emphasize that this line only serves as an intermediate step in a mathematical
calculation of the indexes, that is, in recoding the data. The line should not be
taken as a statistical estimation. It is natural that ambiguity aversion is higher as
the points m(j/10) are lower, analogously to Gilboa and & Schimeidler’s (1989, pp.
4This condition amounts to Chew & Sagi (2008) exchangeability condition. They provided the
main theorem showing that this condition justifies using the source method.
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572, 574) and Dow & da Costa Werlang’s (1992) index of ambiguity aversion (see
Eq. 3.11). We thus define:
b = 1− s− 2c is the index of ambiguity aversion. (3.5)
This component is motivational, reflecting an overall like or dislike of ambiguity.
Under expected utility (ambiguity neutrality) c = 0 and s = 1, and the index has value
0. Positive values indicate ambiguity aversion, with 1 the maximum, and negative
values indicate ambiguity seeking, with -1 the minimum (occurring if the value in
Eq. 3.5 at p = 12 is 1). Further
a = 1− s is the index of (ambiguity-generated likelihood)- insensitivity. (3.6)
This index reflects the shallowness of m and, hence, insensitivity towards changes
in likelihood of the E events. Insensitivity is a cognitive component of ambiguity,
reflecting general (lack of) understanding. It is prior to any liking or disliking, and
means that people simply do not understand ambiguity well, taking it too much as
fifty-fifty. Under expected utility, a = 0, reflecting optimal sensitivity. The index a
usually is positive, reflecting imperfect sensitivity. On exceptional occasions it can
be negative, reflecting oversensitivity in the middle region. Then rare events are
not overweighted but ignored. For further explanations and theoretical background,
see Dimmock et al. (2012). We will investigate how ambiguity attitudes, measured
through the indexes, depend on the outcomes and the sources of uncertainty. We also
used parametric families of subjective-probability transformation functions to fit the
matching probabilities. These functions have commonly been used for decision un-
der risk, capturing risk attitudes. We use them for matching probabilities m(j/10)),
capturing ambiguity attitudes.
Neo-additive:
m(0) = 0;m(1) = 1;m(p) = c+ sp for 0 < p < 1; s ≥ 0, c ≤ 1; m is truncated at 0,1.(3.7)
Indexes of a-insensitivity and ambiguity aversion were defined in Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6.
Goldstein & Einhorn:
m(p) =
bpa
bpa + (1− p)a ; a > 0, b > 0 (3.8)
with a an index of a-insensitivity and b an index of ambiguity aversion.
Prelec (1998) 2-parameter
m(p) = (exp(−(ln(p))a))b; a > 0, b > 0 (3.9)
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Figure 3.1 The neo-additive family
with, again, a an index of a-insensitivity and b an index of ambiguity aversion.
Prelec (1998) 1-parameter 3.9 with b = 1.
Tversky & Kahneman (1992):
m(p) =
pc
(pc + (1− p)c)1/c for c≥0.28 (3.10)
where c is both an index of a-insensitivity and of ambiguity aversion.
3.4 Experimental Design
3.4.1 The basic treatment
We considered five treatments, that is, five combinations of sources and outcomes,
displayed in Table 3.1. Exact wordings of the instructions for subjects are in the
appendix. We partially randomized the order of presentation of the treatments by
using two different orderings: basic, week, year, health, kid, and the other ordering
was reversed: kid, health, year, week, basic.
This subsection presents the first treatment, the basic treatment, which concerns
a standard Ellsberg experiment. Two urns contained 100 balls with ten different
colors: yellow, orange, red, dark-pink, light-pink, purple, dark-blue, light-blue, light-
green and dark-green. For urn K the composition of balls was known, while for urn
U the composition was unknown. The unknown urn U was prepared beforehand by
a third party. Therefore the experimenters themselves did not know its composition
during the experiment.
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treatment source of uncertainty outcome
basic Ellsberg urn money
week Ellsberg urn waiting time (weeks)
year Ellsberg urn waiting time (years)
kid districts money
health viruses life time
Table 3.1 The five treatments
For each j = 1 or 3 or 5, subjects first had to choose j winning colors, which
determined event Ej for urn U. It was next announced how many balls of these
winning colors urn K would contain, where this number did not have to be j/10 and
was different in different choice situations. Then the subject would choose if a ball
was drawn from urn U or urn K. If the color of the ball was a winning color, then the
subject would receive a good outcome (e500), and otherwise a bad outcome (e0)
would result. If the implementation of real incentives involved urn K, i.e. if the
subject had chosen a draw from urn K, then this urn was prepared with the proper
composition by the experimenters in front of the participants of that session.5
number of balls in urn K K U number of balls in urn U
e500 if ball is
yellow, orange,
or red
e0 for other col-
ors
e500 if ball is
yellow, orange,
or red
e0 for other col-
ors
0 100 X
unkown unkown
10 90 X
20 80 X
30 70 X
40 60 X
50 50 X
60 40 X
70 30 X
80 20 X
90 10 X
100 0 X
Table 3.2 The five treatments
For each Ej , we elicited choices for all 101 compositions of winning balls in urn
K using the incentive compatible implementation of refined choice lists introduced
5For implementing the composition of urn K swiftly, for every color, groups of ten balls were
stringed (the balls had holes), thus enabling to quickly and reliably prepare any amount of balls
between 0 and 100 in front of the participants, verifiable for all.
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by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). For low numbers of winning balls in K, subjects should
prefer urn U, and for high numbers urn K. Somewhere in between preferences switch,
and this switching point we measured, as follows. A first choice list (Table 3.2)
included 11 choices between urn K and urn U, with 0, 10, . . . , 100 balls of the
winning color(s) in urn K. The second choice list would then be refined between the
two values where the switching happened. In Table 3.2, this happens between 20
and 30, and the next choice list would include the choices for 21, 22, . . . to 29 balls of
winning color(s) in urn K. From this we are able to infer the choices of the subject
for all 101 compositions of urn K (for 0,1, . . . to 100 balls of the winning color(s)).
If for j winning balls in U, preferences switch between i and i + 1 winning balls in
K, then we estimated the matching probability m(j/10) to be (i+12 )/100. If there
are no switches, then m(j/10) is 0 or 1 as the case may be. The program enforced
monotonicity and did not allow for multiple switches. We would randomly select
one from the 101 compositions of urn K implemented, and not only from the choices
actually asked in the two choice lists, to ensure incentive compatibility.
For each determination of m(j/10) as just described and j = 1, 3, 5, we would
immediately after consider the same set of j colors, but now these were the losing
colors, and the other 10 - j colors were the winning colors. This way we would de-
termine m(1-j/10). We thus obtained two measurements of m(5/10) who were not
statistically different for any treatment, suggesting that there were no different fram-
ing effects. In several following analyses we used the average of the two observations
of m(5/10). Only in fittings they were treated as two separate observations.
3.4.2 Alternative treatment
In the second treatment week, the outcome was changed and was waiting time instead
of money. Subjects did receive money, e250, and did so with certainty. But now
the uncertainty concerned the time of receipt. The favorable outcome was receiving
the money immediately, and the unfavorable outcome was receiving it in eight weeks.
The third treatment year was like the treatment week, only the money to be won with
certainty was e5000 and the time of receipt was either immediately or in 10 years.
Choices in this treatment were hypothetical, and subjects received an immediate flat
payment of e250 if this treatment was selected for implementation. In all else the
two treatments week and year were the same as the basic treatment, concerning the
same Ellsberg urns and the same way to measure matching probabilities m(j/10).
In the fourth treatment, the kid treatment, we did not change the outcomes (e500
or e0) relative to the basic treatment, but instead the source of uncertainty. The
source involved a charitable program in rural India, paying for school education of
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children. We showed our subjects a photo from one of the children whose lives have
been transformed by this charitable program.
The child came from one of 100 villages that were distributed over 10 possible
districts. Subjects could now gamble on the district where the child’s village belongs
to. They could now choose which winning districts (instead of colors) to gamble on.
Our subjects could not be expected to have any geographic knowledge of these villages
or districts, or their sizes. Thus the 10 districts were equally likely to our subjects
in the same way as the 10 colors in the Ellsberg urn were equally likely. The 100
villages are analogous to the 100 balls for Ellsberg, neither being outcome-relevant
beyond their district. Both the photo and the charitable context related to education
can be expected to arouse positive emotions, which may offset the negative emotions
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generated by us concealing information about the districts to our subjects. Hence,
this treatment could have been called the feel-good treatment. Matching probabilities
were measured using the same known urn K as before. Now each district was coupled
with a color, so that gambling on three districts corresponded with gambling on three
colors in the known urn, and so on.
The fifth and final treatment was a health treatment, which deviated more from
the basic treatment than the other treatments did. We now changed both the out-
comes and the source of uncertainty. This treatment was again hypothetical, and
subjects received an immediate flat payment of e250 if this treatment was selected
for implementation. For the source of uncertainty, we employed a virus story. The
subjects were asked to imagine that they were diagnosed with a certain disease and
that they would have to receive a treatment against it. It would furthermore be
known that there are ten possible mutually exclusive viruses (numbered from 1 to
10) causing the exact same disease. There would be no way to diagnose which virus is
causing the disease, but the disease would only be cured if the real virus was treated.
In the case of recovery (disease cured), the subjects would live 50 years longer in
good health, and otherwise one year longer in good health. That is, the outcome
now was life duration.
Subjects were asked to choose between Treatment K and Treatment U. Treatment
K would use a broad-spectrum antiviral supplement with a Known success rate (given
in %). Treatment U was said to be new and would use specific supplements (numbered
from 1 to 10) which would only be effective for the virus with the corresponding
number. Only if the right supplement for the real virus would be chosen, the disease
would be cured. Because the subjects were told that there is no way to diagnose
which virus is causing the disease, the 10 viruses were equally likely to them in the
same way as the Ellsberg colors or the districts were. Event Ej now meant that
only j supplements could be provided. To measure matching probabilities m(j/10),
we now did not use a known urn, but the treatment K with success rates specified
for 0%, 1%, . . . , 100%. Because this fifth health treatment was hypothetical, and
because within the hypothetical story the experimenter could not know about the
true treatment, subjects did not choose the j treatments provided, but the the first
j treatments were offered. This avoids both suspicion and illusion of control, the
common confounds in Ellsberg experiments.
3.4.3 Further experimental details
Subjects
N=66 subjects (73% male, 27% female), bachelor and master students from var-
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ious fields were recruited online from the EconLab website of Erasmus School of
Economics.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the ESE-econlab of the Erasmus University
Rotterdam. There were three sessions, all at the same day.6 They lasted 1.5 to 2
hours.
Incentives
Subjects received a show-up fee of e5. For further payment we used a random
incentive system. Total average earnings were e16.36. One randomly chosen subject
in each of the three sessions received an additional payment on top of the show-up
fee. For this subject we first randomly determined which of the five treatments would
be implemented. Two treatments were hypothetical, for which a fixed payment of
e250 was given. If one of the other three treatments was chosen, then we would
next randomly select the Bayes pobability j/10 (out of six, with j = 5/10 asked
twice). Then we would randomly determine one of the 101 objective probabilities
in urn K, and implement the prospect chosen by the subject for this K. The payoff
was determined by a draw from the urn chosen by the subject, K or U (referring to
districts in the kid treatment). Urn U had been determined beforehand by an outside
party, with its composition unknown to the experimenters. Urn K, if implemented,
was prepared in front of the subjects. The subject playing for real would draw a
ball from the respective urn. If the color of the ball (or district) was included in
the winning colors, then the subject would receive the good outcome, and otherwise
the bad outcome. All implementations of randomness were non-computerized, and
verifiable to the subjects. We implemented all random choices by drawing from bags:
For the subject to be chosen from all subjects in the session we used ID cards, for
the choices of treatment (out of five), Bayes probability (out of six), and composition
of urn K (out of 101) we prepared boxes with numbered table-tennis-balls.
3.4.4 Analysis
Data fitting was done by likelihood maximization, assuming Fechnerian normally
distributed error terms Besides data fitting based on maximum likelihood, we also
did data fitting minimizing squared distances, but here all results were virtually
identical, differing only in fourth digits, and they will not be reported.
6All sessions were scheduled the same day to avoid that participants could learn beforehand
that a charitable program in rural India were involved, and could have gathered information about
it.
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Wilcoxon signed rank tests and t-tests gave the same conclusions throughout.
We report the former because normal distributions of our variables were mostly
rejected. We both did overall fitting and fittings at the individual levels. For the
overall fitting, we assume that all subjects have the same matching probabilities.
We then fit an overall matching probability function with each parameter containing
dummy variables for different treatments using the basic treatment as the baseline.
To compare across treatments, we use the Wald test to see whether the coefficients
for different treatments differ. For the individual fitting, we fitted the functions for
each subject individually in each treatment. We report the results of the overall
fittings. Individual fittings gave the same results (see section 3.A.2).
3.5 Results
We used two orders of presenting the stimuli, but found no differences in results and,
hence, pool all data (see section 3.A.2).
3.5.1 Descriptive results regarding ambiguity aversion,
a-insensitivity, and outcome- versus event-dependence
Figure 3.2 plots the mean matching probabilities m(j/10) and displays the main
phenomena, which will later be confirmed by statistical tests. The curves are on
average somewhat below 0.5, meaning that there is more ambiguity aversion than
ambiguity seeking. But ambiguity aversion is not strong, and for low likelihoods there
is prevailing ambiguity seeking. Thus the prevailing phenomenon is a-insensitivity.
The curves are almost linear in the interior, suggesting that neo-additive functions
will fit the data well.
As for comparisons between treatments, the curves of the three Ellsberg treat-
ments are very similar and, hence, outcomes do not affect ambiguity attitudes.
Changes in the source of uncertainty, in the kid and health treatments, do affect
ambiguity attitudes. In particular, sensitivity becomes much better.
3.5.2 Statistical tests of ambiguity aversion, a-insensitivity,
and outcome- versus event-dependence
Table 3.3 presents estimations of the indexes of Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6 resulting from overall
estimations. There is some ambiguity aversion, but it is close to the neutral level of
0, and for the health treatment it is only marginally significant. A-insensitivity is
strong. Comparing across treatments, changes of outcomes do not affect the indexes,
which are the same for the treatments basic, week, and year, as confirmed by ANOVA
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Figure 3.2 Mean matching probability
(p = 0.98 and 0.88). Changing the source of uncertainty in the kid treatment gives
lower ambiguity aversion (p < 0.001) and much better sensitivity (p < 0.001) than
in the basic treatment. The health treatment has yet more sensitivity than the kid
treatment (p < 0.001), and seemingly more ambiguity aversion that is, however not
significantly different (p = 0.7).
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basic week year kid health
ambiguity aversion index b 0.15** 0.16** 0.13** 0.04* 0.03ms
a-insensitivity index a 0.81** 0.8** 0.83** 0.55** 0.34**
p-value of Wald test against H0: = 0: ms: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.0001.
Table 3.3 Estimations of ambiguity indices
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Table 3.4 analyses ambiguity attitudes per event (Eqs. 3.1-3.3), presenting the
median event-dependent ambiguity aversion index per event and treatment. It shows
that we have ambiguity seeking for the unlikely events E1 and E3 and ambiguity aver-
sion for all other events, including E5, except for E7 and E9 in the health treatment,
where we have neutrality.
3.5.3 Parametric fitting
Table 3.5 shows that the ordering of goodess of fit is: (1) neo-additive; (2) Goldstein &
Einhorn; (3) Prelec 2-parameter; (4) Prelec 1-parameter; (5) Tversky & Kahneman,
both by the variance explained and by the AIC criterion. The AIC criterion corrects
for the number of parameters used, but still the two-parameter families perform
best. It is apparently important to consider both the aversion and the insensivitity
component to study ambiguity, and focusing on one (Prelec 1-parameter considers
only insensitivity) or combining the two (Tversky & Kahneman) loses too much
explanatory power. Other than this, the ordering found is different than for risk
(Stott (2006); Balcombe & Fraser (2013)). The reason is that insensitivity plays a
more central role for ambiguity than for risk. Hence the neo-additive family, which
can readily handle extreme degrees of insensitivity, fares best, and hence Prelec’s
1-parameter family fares better here than Tversky & Kahneman’s. That Goldstein
& Einhorn fare some better than Prelec’s two-parameter family may be because
the former better separates the two parameters. In Prelec’s family, the insensitivity
parameter a overlaps some with the b parameter in also capturing some aversion. An
advantage of the Prelec 2-parameter family is that it is more tractable analytically,
and that it received a preference foundation (Prelec (1998)).
For all families, we repeated the analyses of the aversion and insensitivity param-
eters as done with our indexes. All analyses confirm the findings of our analyses in
terms of the indexes.
neo-
additive
Goldstein-
Einhorn
Prelec 2-
parameter
Prelec 1-
parameter
Tversky
& Kahne-
man
least square
R2
0.234 0.232 0.229 0.202 0.083
maximum
likeli-
hood:AIC
-0.521 -0.518 -0.513 -0.484 -0.345
Table 3.5 Fit of parametric families
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3.5.4 Further analysis
By monotonicity, m(j/10) should be increasing in j. We found that there is much
insensitivity, with m only weakly increasing with a shallow slope. Because of this, and
because of the randomness that is common in decision experiments, we can expect
many violations of monotonicity at the individual level. We tested monotonicity in all
cases possible. The second row in Table 3.6 gives the percentages of violations for the
five treatments. These relatively high percentages, higher than are commonly found
in experiments for decision under risk, confirm that there is much insensitivity. They
also confirm that choices are most rational in the health treatment, second-most in
the kid treatment, and they are least so, and about equal, in the remaining three
treatments.
basic week year kid health
violations of monotonicity 25% 28% 27% 19% 14%
correlations of indices 0.41** 0.35** 0.35** 0.14 0.35**
** p < 0.004
Table 3.6 Violations of monotonicity, and correlations between indexes
Although ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity are conceptually distinct and
orthogonal, they may well be empirically correlated. A positive correlation is natural
because the indexes both concern deviations from Bayesianism and, according to
many, deviations from rationality. The third row in Table 3.6 gives the correlations
of the two indexes for each of the five treatments. The correlations all are significantly
positive except in the kid treatment.
3.5.5 Discussion of experimental details
For the basic treatment with the unknown Ellsberg urn and also for the kid treatment,
subjects could choose the colors/districts to gamble on. Otherwise, subjects might
suspect that the experimenters had rigged the urns or chosen bad districts so as to
pay less to subjects. A drawback of this implementation is that subjects can have an
illusion of control (which can lead to over- but also to underestimation of likelihood,
effects that may average out). Despite this drawback, our implementation is the
favored one in the literature today because it avoids suspicion. That, immediately
after having gambled on an event, the subjects gamble on the complementary event
serves as a further measure against suspicion, making clear to subjects that we had
no interest in rigging urns or districts.
We grouped events and their complements together to make likelihoods clearer to
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subjects and thus obtain replies of higher quality. This way we can directly measure
Schmeidler (1989)’s indexes of ambiguity aversion. There, the matching probabilities
m(j/10) that we measure are the capacities of the events Ej . Schmeidler (1989) and
Dow & da Costa Werlang (1992) proposed the violations of additivity captured by
1−m(j/10)−m(1− j/10) (3.11)
as indexes of ambiguity aversion. They are the sum of the event-dependent ambiguity
indexes (Eq. 3.1) of Ej and its complement E10−j , and they have been widely used
since. Our index b of ambiguity aversion is an aggregation of Schmeidler’s indexes
for the pairs (E1,E9), (E3,E7), and (E5,E5c).
Two treatments in our design are hypothetical, even though there are many rea-
sons to prefer real incentives to hypothetical choice. That the health treatment had
to be hypothetical, and that this cannot be avoided due to the artificial nature of
the Ellsberg experiment, which is one of the main messages of this paper, will be
explained in section 3.6. One of the purposes of the third treatment was to test
the hypothetical bias. That we found no differences between this treatment and the
second, incentivized, treatment suggests that there is no hypothetical bias in our
design. The good quality of the results in the health treatment, better than in the
other treatments, and with subjects apparently well motivated, further suggests that
we have no hypothetical bias.
Because of the high insensitivity that we found, with many violations of mono-
tonicity, the behavior of our subjects in the first three treatments comes close to
models of complete ignorance, where all ambiguous events are treated alike, leading
to a maximal insensitivity index of 1. Such behavior was axiomatized by Cohen
& Jaffray (1980), and underlies the modeling of ambiguity in Jaffray (1989). Gul
& Pesendorfer (2014) developed an extended version of Jaffray’s model, avoiding
the use of exogenous objective probabilities. Their Axiom 3 for diffuse events, and
the explanation following it, allow for complete insensitivity and violations of strict
monotonicity.
3.6 General discussion
We first discuss the basic treatment with the classical Ellsberg urns (10 colors) and
monetary outcomes. Here we find the usual prevailing ambiguity aversion as appear-
ing from our a-index. In particular, for the ambiguous fifty-fifty event of five colors,
which is similar to the two-color Ellsberg paradox, 79% of the subjects exhibited am-
biguity aversion.7 For unlikely events (one and three colors), a-insensitivity has an
7The events of the three-color Ellsberg paradox cannot be readily compared to our events of sim-
ilar likelihood (with three or seven colors). The three-color Ellsberg paradox has one unambiguous
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effect opposite to ambiguity aversion, giving ambiguity seeking. This is what we find,
with over 80% of the subjects exhibiting ambiguity seeking. This finding confirms
Ellsberg’s prediction of the 1960s(Ellsberg (2001, p. 203 ll. 12-14; pp. 205-206)) and
agrees with common empirical findings. Combined with ambiguity aversion for likely
events it gives an estimated insensitivity index of 0.80, showing that this component
is also present in the traditional Ellsberg setting.
The variation of outcomes, keeping the Ellsberg urn of the basic treatment but
using short incentivized waiting times as outcomes, or using long and unincentivized
waiting times, did not have any effect on the indexes or on the ambiguity aversion
for any event. Changing the source of uncertainty from Ellsberg urns to districts of
children while keeping the monetary outcomes of the basic treatment greatly affected
ambiguity attitudes.
The aforementioned findings answer the questions raised in the introduction.
Ambiguity attitudes do depend on events, and more so than on outcomes. Hence
modeling ambiguity attitudes through event functions is more natural than through
outcome functions. Although ambiguity aversion is prevailing, it is not strong and
for unlikely events we even find the opposite. Hence, ambiguity aversion cannot be
treated as a universal phenomenon.
Our deviating findings for the kid treatment are unsurprising given that we delib-
erately induced positive emotions for these events. In this sense our finding is similar
to Tversky & Fox (1995), whose finding of ambiguity seeking for ambiguity related
to basket ball under basket ball fans is similarly unsurprising. Readers may want
to criticize these findings for being generated by specific details of events and not
being representative of general ambiguity. Let us first agree with the latter point.
However, and this is in fact our point, ambiguity attitudes have always been gener-
ated by particular event-specific emotions. The uncertainty in the Ellsberg urns, and
many related experiments, is particular with relevant information deliberately kept
secret for no clear reason and contrasted with other events for which no such secrets
are kept. We face natural uncertainties with no probabilities known in our decisions
every day, but they rarely involve Ellsberg-type aversive secrets.
The great preference of our subjects for the district uncertainty over the Ellsberg
urns can be criticized for being irrational. The only outcomes resulting for our
subjects are money amounts, and only the likelihoods of these obtaining are relevant.
Those likelihoods are equivalent when generated by 10 balls or when generated by
10 districts of a nice child. No outcome, neither the fates of our subjects nor the fate
of the child will be different in the two situations. Hence the two decision situations
should be treated the same. Yet our subjects let the pleasant thoughts about the
event, whereas in our case all events within one source are uniformly ambiguous.
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charity for the child leak into positive evaluations of prospects. They will also let
the negative thoughts about concealed information leak into negative evaluations
of prospects. We agree that such leaking is irrational. Such irrational interaction
between the events and the value of the prospect reflects a violation of Savage (1954)
independence of tastes and beliefs. Yet such interactions underly every nonexpected
utility model.
Our findings show that events rather than outcomes influence ambiguity atti-
tudes. It could be conjectured that ambiguity attitudes could then still be modeled
through utility functions, by using different utility functions of the same outcomes
for different sources of uncertainty (§2). However, several studies tested such de-
pendencies of utility and did not find it (Abdellaoui et al. (2011); Abdellaoui et al.
(2013); Abdellaoui et al. (2014)). Another problem of outcome-function models is
that they are not homeomorphic, meaning that they cannot reflect natural psycho-
logical processes. Ambiguity concerns events and how people feel about those, and
not how they feel about outcomes. At any rate, based on our empirical findings we
conclude that the outcome based ambiguity models do not work well for empirical
purposes.
The health treatment with life duration depending on unknown viruses can less
readily be compared to the other treatments because both the source of uncertainty
and the outcomes differ from the other treatments. This treatment serves to avoid
the emotions generated by unnatural sources of uncertainty in the other treatments,
and in this sense to be more representative of natural uncertainties. Accordingly, a
crucial feature of this treatment is that the uncertainties with known and unknown
probabilities refer to similar kinds of uncertainties, having to do with viruses and
fighting them. There are no emotional asymmetries between known and unknown
probabilities where one is associated with positive or negative social emotions and
the other is not. The only real difference between the two uncertainties in the health
treatment is that one deals with new risks for which no statistics are available yet,
and the other deals with known risks for which we do have statistics. This is the
essence of the difference between ambiguity and risk. Hence we feel that the health
treatment is closest to natural uncertainties and ambiguities.
In one respect the health treatment cannot be realistic, which forced us to resort
to a hypothetical gedanken experiment and hypothetical choice. It is that we should
have a number of uncertainties given beforehand that are completely exchangeable
and symmetric in every respect. We need this feature for direct comparability with
the Ellsberg urn which is the topic of this paper, and where such symmetry is central.
That such symmetries are virtually absent from practice, and that it is virtually
impossible to come up with a realistic example of this kind with real incentives,
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can be held against the representativeness of the Ellsberg urns for applications. It
may be more interesting to study general sources of uncertainty and their general
characteristics without trying to directly relate to the ambiguity attitudes of Ellsberg
urns. Abdellaoui et al. (2011, second experiment) showed how the source method can
be used in such cases. In the present paper, however, we focused on the ambiguity
attitudes mostly studied in the literature as yet, to shed light on the general validity
of the Ellsberg experiments.
The high sensitivity in the health treatment, and absence of ambiguity aversion,
are remarkable. Subjects discriminated different levels of likelihood considerably
better than in the other treatments. It suggests greater interest and better motivation
on the part of subjects, even though this treatment could not satisfy the real incentive
principle of experimental economics. It has been observed before that subjects are
well motivated to answer questions about health, even if hypothetical (Bleichrodt &
Pinto Prades (2009, end of §2)). In the same spirit, many people voluntarily donate
money to support medical investigations.
That ambiguity attitudes found in Ellsberg urns are not very representative of
natural ambiguities, and that ambiguity attitudes can depend much on the source
of uncertainty involved, can be taken as bad news. It increases generality at the
cost of predictability. We think that the variety of uncertain events that we face
is too rich and varied to expect simple laws to hold in great generality There are
too many kinds of uncertainties, and non-Bayesian (irrational!?) ways to think. In
this sense, ambiguity, i.e. nonprobabilized events, can be compared to commodities,
say nonmonetary outcomes. One cannot expect one kind of utility function to hold
for all nonmonetary commodities, or utility to be more concave for all nonmonetary
outcomes than for monetary outcomes. Our empirical domain is, simply, too rich.
General attitudes towards uncertainties, and relations between them, have to be
studied so as to maximize predictability and to reduce generality as much as possible.
We chose waiting time as outcome because there is much interest in the effect of
ambiguity on optimal stopping times. See Della Seta et al. (2013), Miao & Wang
(2011), Nishimura & Ozaki (2004), Nishimura & Ozaki (2007), and Riedel (2009).
The results of these studies could be distorted if ambiguity attitudes towards waiting
time were different from other ambiguity attitudes. It may then be reassuring that
ambiguity attitudes do not change for waiting times. We chose life duration as third
outcome because this is a central outcome in the health domain.
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3.7 Conclusion
We find no support for outcome dependence of ambiguity attitudes in between-
outcome comparisons, i.e., when changing outcomes while keeping the source of un-
certainty fixed. This adds to the same finding in the literature keeping outcomes
fixed while changing sources. We do find support for event-dependence of ambigu-
ity attitudes between sources, i.e. when changing the source of uncertainty. This
evidence supports event-based theories of ambiguity such as prospect theory and
multiple priors against outcome-based theories such as the smooth model.
We also find support for event-dependence of ambiguity aversion within sources,
where aversion changes to seeking if events change from likely to unlikely. This find-
ing again supports event-based ambiguity theories against outcome-based theories.
It also supports the importance of insensitivity besides aversion to ambiguity. For
parametric families to analyze ambiguity, more than for risk, it is important to cap-
ture insensitivity (inverse-S) properly. Hence parametric families that can properly
model insensitivity will be most suited to analyze ambiguity attitudes.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Instructions
The virus story
Imagine that you are diagnosed with a certain disease. You have to receive a treat-
ment against the disease. There is no possibility to abstain from treatment. The only
choice you have is which treatment you will receive. Research on the disease all over
the world has revealed the following facts: There are ten possible viruses causing the
disease (i.e. virus 1, virus 2, virus 3, virus 4, virus 5, virus 6, virus 7, virus 8, virus
9, and virus 10). The prevalence (the rate of occurrence) of the viruses causing the
disease is unknown. And there is no way to diagnose which virus you have; they all
lead to the same disease. (The viruses are mutually exclusive; you will always have
just one virus). Only if the real virus is treated will the disease be totally cured.
Treatment K
Treatment K treats the disease with a Known success rate. The success rate is
known from experiences with previous patients. It uses a broad-spectrum antiviral
supplement, which is not specific to any one of the viruses, but is generally effective
for all viruses alike. For example, for treatment K, the success rate can be 10%. We
will also consider other possible success rates. If you are cured by treatment K, you
will live 50 years longer from now on in good health; otherwise you will live only 1
year longer from now on in good health.
Treatment U
Treatment U is new. It uses ten different supplements. We name the ten supplements
S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, and S10 respectively. Each supplement is effective
for the corresponding virus. (For example, supplement S7 is only effective for virus
7.) However, different supplements are not always available. You will therefore be
treated only with the available supplements. Remember that there is no way to tell
which virus causes your disease. If the right supplement for the real virus is chosen,
then you will be cured and live 50 years longer from now on in good health; otherwise
you will live only 1 year longer from now on in good health.
Indian Districts
One bets not only on urns but also on an option of Children’s welfare (Option C).
Option C concerns school-building work in rural India. The Satya Bharti School
Program aims to make available free, high quality primary and secondary education
to poor children in the rural areas of India. The kid in the photo is one of the kids
whose lives have been transformed because of this program. The program helped 100
villages in 10 districts in India and the kid is from one of the 100 villages. You can
bet on the district where the kid’s village belongs.
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3.A.2 Web Appendix
See http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/pdf/webapp_indian_kids.pdf
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Chapter 4
If Nudge Cannot Be Applied:
A Litmus Test of the Readers’
Stance on Paternalism1
4.1 Introduction
Descriptive models in behavioral economics were devised to capture empirical devi-
ations from classical decision principles. Studying these descriptive models helps us
to better understand certain empirical patterns of inconsistencies and/or biases of
human behavior in decision making. Further, taking the classical principles as nor-
mative, the empirical deviations from them, captured by descriptive models, leave
space for improving the empirically observed decisions. Paradoxically, the prescrip-
tive2 value of normative models depends on the existence of such deviations; as Raiffa
(1961) put it: “We do not have to teach people what comes naturally.”
Attempts at prescriptive improvements of decisions can lead to paternalism, and
consequently ethical and moral objections can be raised. There have indeed been
many debates about paternalism. A central issue is whether one (for instance, a
decision analyst) can ever go against the stated preferences of the people affected.
Critics of paternalism emphasize that one should never impose a choice on people
against their own will.
1This chapter is based on the paper “If Nudge Cannot Be Applied: A Litmus Test of the Readers’
Stance on Paternalism” co-authored with Chen Li and Peter P. Wakker, and published in Theory
and Decision
2Prescriptive applications use normative models to improve decisions but reckon with descriptive
limitations.
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A new impulse for decision theory came from libertarian paternalism, often re-
ferred to as nudge, following Thaler & Sunstein (2003). A clever way was found
to improve empirical decisions using the techniques of behavioral economics while
never going against the will of the people affected. People are nudged in the right
direction of choice, while left with full freedom of choice. This approach can be used
in situations where people have no clear preferences, and it has led to a variety of
applications (Jones et al. (2011) and Thaler & Sunstein (2008)).
In practice, situations arise where people’s preferences are explicitly stated while
at variance with normative principles. Then the central question, critical to debates
on paternalism, is whether a decision analyst can seek to improve decisions while
going against the stated preferences of a client, or whether one should respect stated
preferences and forego purported improvements. Libertarian paternalism avoids ad-
dressing this central question. We use four thought experiments to show that this
question cannot always be avoided. In each of these four experiments, a dilemma is
faced, and a paternalistic decision should be made or forgo ne, with no possibility of
avoiding the dilemma comprised in the central question.
The exact details of our four thought experiments are unlikely to arise in practice,
and they were not developed for this purpose. They constitute gedanken-experiments
common in philosophy, serving to maximally clarify the relevant issues. These issues
are central in many practical decisions, playing a role in all decisions that affect other
people. The four thought experiments represent real decision situations where the
dilemma in the central question cannot be avoided, and a decision has to be made,
one way or another. This leads to our main purpose: we provide a litmus test on
the readers’ stance on paternalism, and a way to organize stances in the literature.
Our secondary purpose is to convince the readers that paternalism itself is sometimes
appropriate, and consumer sovereignty should not always be respected . However,
this argument is controversial and no consensus is likely to come soon.
4.2 Views on paternalism
Paternalistic interventions often improve people’s well-being. Taxation policies are
used to regulate addictive behaviors such as smoking. The “no drink driving” reg-
ulation that helps reduce traffic accidents is another example. Yet many objections
to paternalistic interventions can still be raised. One such objection is based on a
desire to avoid power manipulations. Paternalistic interventions give decision ana-
lysts/policy makers the power to influence the decisions of others, and may be misused
for self-interest rather than for the well -being of the people affected. Although this
is a strong argument against paternalism, it will not be considered in this paper for
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reasons of simplicity. We focus on what we called the central question and assume
that the only purpose of a decision analyst is to optimize others’ wellbeing.
A second objection against paternalism takes issue with the assumption that
particular decision principles can be qualified as normative. In reply, our analysis
will only assume stochastic dominance and transitivity as normative principles, whose
normative status is uncontroversial, although some doubts have still been expressed
(Bell (1982); Loomes & Sugden (1982) and Mandler (2005)). We emphasize that
our discussion needs no commitment to a normative status of expected utility or any
other specific optimization theory. Our examples also pose a dilemma for people
who advocate using heuristics rather than optimization theories (Berg & Gigerenzer
(2010)).
A third objection extends the second one. The argument is that individual de-
cision makers’ preferences reflect their true values which they know better than any
outsider can. Therefore, it is best for individual decision makers to decide for them-
selves what is best for them. This objection is sometimes supported by Hume’s
famous citation “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions”, where
preferences are taken as passions that should never be overruled by paternalistic
reasons (Hume (1740)).3
A fourth objection is that people should always have the freedom to follow their
own preferences, irrespective of whether these preferences are optimal in some sense
or not (McQuillin & Sugden (2012, p. 556)). In a similar spirit, it can be argued
that people need not get what others think to be best; instead, they should get
what they choose for themselves. In defense of this objection, some may advance an
evolutionary interpretation, claiming that the best preferences will then survive in
the long run. Others may base their arguments on direct ethical principles, assigning
an intrinsic value to freedom of choice (Sugden (2004)).
For later discussion, we group these four objections, while raised from differ-
ent perspectives, under the name anti-paternalism. Other terms used in the litera-
ture for anti-paternalistic positions are the Humean view on preference, or consumer
sovereignty.
Several moderate positions have been advanced. Cautious paternalism (O’Donoghue
& Rabin (1999)) and libertarian paternalism are similar, combined in soft paternalism
(McQuillin & Sugden (2012, p. 560)). They advocate interventions, such as smartly
designed choice structures, education, and/or incentive schemes, which nudge people
to better choices, while keeping the ultimate decision power with individuals. In
this way, people without a stable and consistent preference will be influenced by the
3Our interpretation of Hume’s citation is different, and we think that it does not preclude
paternalism. Broome (1993) and Sugden (1998, p. 48) present critical discussions.
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structure and therefore go for the choice that is most probably the best for them.
On the other hand, those who choose differently from the paternalistic suggestion
are more likely the ones who understand themselves better and opt for a genuinely
different preference.
Asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al. (2003)) gives a special importance to
rational individuals. It purports that rational individuals, who can independently
make the best decisions, should be harmed as little as possible. Therefore, in cases
where a paternalistic decision needs to be made for a group of people, but a separation
between rational and irrational individuals is impossible, priority should be given to
ensure that no harm is done to rational individuals. Paternalistic interventions should
be restrained even if, on average, they benefit ed the majority of people.
Moderate positions make paternalistic interventions less controversial as they take
into account an individual’s own will. However, their applicability is limited. In many
situations, they cannot provide us with guidance, as our thought experiments will
demonstrate.
The most far-reaching form of paternalism is optimal paternalism, advocated by
Zamir (1998) and O’Donoghue & Rabin (2003). They argue against the overweight-
ing of rational individuals in asymmetric paternalism, and favor occasional coercive
paternalistic interventions. The latter can be justified in situations where the cost of
allowing irrational individuals to make errors significantly exceeds the harm brought
to rational individuals by paternalistic interventions. These authors recommend us-
ing cost benefit analyses to find optimal policies, thus taking a purely economic
perspective.
4.3 The decision to be taken, and two quality-of-life
measurements
In the thought experiments that we now consider, you can imagine yourself to be a
decision analyst (or a doctor) who has to decide on a medical treatment for a client.
Your client’s status quo is that he suffers from impaired vision. There is only one
treatment available that may cure him and bring back perfect vision, but there is a
risk of failure, leading to complete blindness. You must choose between treatment
and the status quo (no treatment) for your client.
Unfortunately, in addition to impaired vision, your client is now unconscious,
which is only temporary, has no serious consequences, and does not affect vision or
health. This means that you cannot communicate with him now. You cannot wait
until the client regains consciousness, because t he treatment works only if carried
out immediately . Hence arguments for patient autonomy play no role here. For
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simplicity, we assume that the treatment is cheap, simple, and has no side effects.
We assume that medical arguments give no clear verdict. The subjective quality-of-
life perception of your client regarding the vision levels is the deciding factor.
As explained before, we assume that your only interest is to choose what is best
for your client. You do not have to account for your decision to any outside party,
but you do account to your own conscience. Legal considerations play no role, but
moral ones do. Note that both a choice of treatment and a choice of the status quo
are your choice, and morally you are equally responsible for both.
Your decision is based on information about the quality of life evaluation of the
status quo (called status quo quality from now on) as relative to the quality of treat-
ment (called treatment quality from now on). To determine the former, we consider
two quality of life measurement methods commonly used in the health domain. We
assume that, besides these two measurements, no other relevant information about
the status quo quality is available. In particular, you cannot make your own assess-
ment of this quality and must go entirely by the information from the quality of life
measurements.
The first, traditional, measurement method is the probability equivalent (PE)
method, often called the standard gamble method in the health domain (Drummond
et al. (1997)). In the measurement survey, participants are asked to choose between
the status quo (indicated by a neutral face symbol in Figure 4.1) and a hypothetical
treatment. All treatments considered either result in complete recovery with perfect
vision (indicated by a smiley symbol ) or the worst possible outcome of complete
blindness (indicated by a frownie symbol). The treatments differ only in their success
ratio - the probability of complete recovery (p in Figure 4.1). Participants are asked
the question in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Probability equivalent question
The switching value p is an index of the quality of life of the status quo. We call
p the status quo quality, abbreviated sqq. The higher sqq is, the better the status
quo is judged to be by the client. Although this method is often analyzed assuming
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expected utility, we do not need this assumption in what follows. We will never
assume more than transitivity and stochastic dominance.4Given the switching value
sqq of the client, we have the following indifference:
Figure 4.2 Status quo quality (probability sqq)
The second measurement method is the certainty equivalent (CE) method, which
is indirect and more laborious. Each survey participant is presented with a rich set
of vision levels varying from perfect vision to blindness. The status quo is contained
in this set. Initially, some treatment with success ratio p1 is chosen. Participants are
asked the question in Figure 4.3:
Figure 4.3 Certainty equivalent question
Figure 4.4 Second status quo quality (probability ssqq)
If the switching vision level given by the client is better than the status quo, then
the success ratio is decreased, and if it is worse, then the success ratio is increased.
The choice question is repeated with the new success ratio. This process goes on
4Our assumption of indifference at the switching value amounts to a kind of continuity, but is
not essential to our arguments and is only made to simplify the presentation. Strict preferences at
either side of the switching value suffice for our analysis. The fact that a choice must be made in
each decision situation does not reflect a completeness assumption, but is intrinsic to the decision
situation. This is discussed further in section 4.5.3.
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until a success ratio pi is found for which the switching vision level is the status quo.
The resulting success ratio is again an index of quality of life of the status quo. We
abbreviate it as the second status quo quality, or ssqq. The higher ssqq is, the better
the status quo is judged to be by the client. We now have the following indifference
in Figure 4.4.
It is natural to expect that sqq =s sqq, which follows from the classical decision
principles of transitivity and stochastic dominance. The equality is especially natu-
ral if the interviews were conducted carefully, with clients understanding the stakes
well and (if possible. . . ) being proficient in decision theory. It would also help if
interviewers could interact with the subjects and influence answers, which is useful
in prescriptive as opposed to descriptive applications (Keeney & Raiffa (1976, §5.8)
and Payne et al. (1999) and Edwards & Elwyn (2006)). However, we assume that the
measurements were conducted as is common in most descriptive and applied stud-
ies, where there is only limited time for the measurements and explanations, where
there can be no interaction to influence answers, and where interviewers themselves
are often not well versed in decision theory. These limitations are unavoidable in
large-scale quality-of-life measurements, and obviously preclude any interactions to
discover or correct violations of decision principles. In this case, violations of the
equality sqq =s sqq can result.
4.4 The four cases
This section presents the four thought experiments used to identify stances on pa-
ternalism. Henceforth, we will call them four cases. From now on, imagine that the
only treatment available for your client has a success ratio 0.90. Because the success
ratio is an index of the quality of the treatment, we call it the treatment quality, or
tq, in analogy to sqq. The decision situation faced by you is depicted in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 The real treatment decision
In each of the following four cases, our question to the readers will be: given that
the tq of the treatment is 0.90, would you choose treatment or the status quo for your
client? The readers may want to make up their own mind immediately after reading
each case, and before reading the pro and con arguments put forward by others.
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CASE 4.1S [Statistical information]. You do not know the sqq of your client. But
you do know the sqq, based on the PE method, of 10,000 similar clients with the
same status quo vision level as your client. The mean, median, and modus sqq over
these 10,000 clients are all 0.91, slightly exceeding the tq of 0.90.
In Case 4.1S, although the sqq of your client is unknown, you probably consider
0.91 to be the best estimate of your client’s sqq, based on the information gathered
from 10,000 similar clients. You will probably choose for the status quo, which fol-
lows naturally from the analysis in Figure 4.6, which assumes only transitivity and
stochastic dominance.5 We expect this to be the answer of most readers (when first
reading).
Figure 4.6 The analysis of Case 4.1S
CASE 4.2DS [Double Statistical information]. In this case, besides the sqqs of Case
4.1S, you also have information about the sqq =s sqq of 10,000 similar clients. The
mean, median, and modus of sqq =s sqq are, however, 0.85, which is considerably
lower than the sqq of 0.91 found before, and the tq of 0.90.
In Case 4.2DS you face a large inconsistency in the data. At least one of the two
measurements is incorrect and cannot reflect a genuine maximization of happiness.
A natural first reaction is that the data are of poor quality, and that no decision
should be based on such poor data. You would want to obtain better information.
This could be done by interacting with 10,000 similar clients, or at least with some
of them, to reconcile the inconsistencies. You could also communicate with the client
or people close to him. However, in all of the four thought experiments, we assume
that you have to make a decision now, with no other information available, nor any
possibility to interact. Such situations are common in practice, especially in policy
decisions. Facing the incoherence in revealed preferences, our thought experiment
requires that you, as a decision analyst, devise a strategy to resolve it. Bear in mind
5The left indifference follows the PE measurement (Figure 4.2) with sqq = 0.91. The strict
preference follows from stochastic dominance. The preference of status quo over treatment then
follows from transitivity.
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that a refusal to take any action is not possible. Doing nothing means choosing the
status quo. As an sqq of 0.91 suggests a preference for the status quo, whereas an
sqq =s sqq of 0.85 suggests the opposite, the two methods give contradictory sug-
gestions. You may reason that, if the truth is in the middle between 0.91 and 0.85
in Case 4.2DS, then 0.88 is the best estimate of the status quo quality. It is below
the treatment quality tq = 0.90, suggesting that treatment is better. This answer
is enhanced by the observation that a wrong treatment decision is off by only 0.01
if the sqq of 0.91 reflects the true preference, whereas a wrong choice of the status
quo is off by 0.05 if the sqq =s sqq of 0.85 reveals the truth. Hence, we expect most
readers to choose treatment in Case 4.2DS.
CASE 4.3SI [Statistical and Individual information]. In this case, besides the sqqs
and sqq =s sqq of the previous cases, you also know the sqq of your client, and it is
0.91.
Here we expect the readers to be divided. Although the information about 10,000
clients reveals large inconsistencies, the information about the preference of the client
himself does not. His sqq exceeds the tq, suggesting a preference of the status quo
over treatment. It is natural to think that the client’s own stated preference should
be more relevant than evaluations by other similar clients, further supporting your
choice of the status quo. Yet an argument for treatment can also be supported. Al-
though there is no direct evidence of inconsistent preference of your client, you can
expect that he is probably like the 10,000 others, and is probably subject to the same
inconsistencies.Taking possible inconsistencies into account, you can still adhere to
the treatment decision of the previous Case 4.2DS, and also choose treatment in the
present Case 4.3SI.
CASE 4.4I [Individual information]. In this case, you do not have the information
on similar clients. You only know the sqq of your client, which is 0.91.
Case 4.4I seems to be even clearer than Case 4.1S. Unlike Case 4.2DS and Case
4.3SI, there are no apparent inconsistencies in the data available on this case. Given
that your client’s sqq exceeds tq, we expect most readers to prefer the status quo
here.
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4.5 Using the cases as a litmus test on paternalistic
views
Table 4.1 lists the most common stances, ordered from least to most paternalistic,
with the number of tr (treatment) choices increasing.
4.5.1 Invalid stances
Before discussing valid stances, we first discuss some invalid ones. Refusal stance.
This stance entails the refusal to take any decision in Case 4.2DS. Strictly speaking,
this stance is not possible in our thought experiments, but we know from experience
that some readers will still want to consider it. The argument for refusal can be that
no decision can be taken on such poor information, and one really has to get better
information. Expressing doubts about decisions without committing to any may be
possible in philosophical debates, but is not possible in our thought experiments, as it
is usually not in practice. A purpose of our thought experiments is to show that taking
a position on reconciling inconsistencies is unavoidable, contrary to what the refusal
stance entails. People sympathetic to the refusal stance may include practitioners
reluctant to involve in gedanken-experiments, and experimenters reluctant to consider
hypothetical choice, even though the latter is essential in prescriptive applications
(Keeney & Raiffa (1976, §1.4.3)). We will not consider the refusal stance any further.
The ostrich stance [row 1 or 2]. A widespread misunderstanding is to think that if
your data do not show any violation of a model, then you may use that model for data
analysis, even though other studies designed to test the model did find violations.6
The data of Cases 4.1S and 4.4I do not show a violation of expected utility and,
hence, according to the ostrich stance, one may use expected utility to analyze these
cases. Then the status quo is chosen, as easily follows from transitivity and stochastic
dominance (conditions verified by expected utility). Thus weak anti-paternalism in
row 2 may result, or, more likely, anti-paternalism in row 1.
Many applications of expected utility and, for instance, many analyses of PE
and CE measurements, are based on this misunderstanding. We disagree with the
ostrich stance. In the Cases 4.1S and 4.4I, no violations of expected utility showed
up only because the data did not test for them. Assuming absence of violations is
like a doctor who declares a disease non-existent simply because he did not test for it.
Inconsistencies are not the real problem, but they are a symptom of the real problem.
6See Birnbaum (1992, p. 21, 2nd column, 2nd para), Cohen & Einav (2007, pp. 746-747) and
Diamond (2008, p. 1860 1st para)). A related problem is that many medical applications use
PE measurements as the gold standard, based only on the normative expected utility foundation,
without concern about the many descriptive biases that have been documented (Drummond et al.
(1997); Torrance & Feeny (1989, p. 560))
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The real problem concerns the biases in people’s preferences. They will be present in
Cases 4.1S and 4.4I as much as in the other two cases. Evidence for general violations
of expected utility is reviewed by Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000). Violations for
the types of questions considered in our thought experiments are referenced later.
Non-statistical stance [row 1 or 3]. Many people erroneously think that statistical
information is not relevant to individual cases. Therefore, the data of the 10,000
similar subjects supposedly should play no role in the treatment decision of your
client. This stance will choose the status quo in Cases 4.3SI and 4.4I, only paying
uncritical attention to the information coming from one individual client there. This
stance can lead to anti-paternalism in row 1 or weak anti-paternalism in row 3.
The non-statistical stance is surprisingly widespread (Steiner (1999)). In the health
domain, it is often based on the Hippocratic Oath that doctors take, swearing to do
what is best for their patient (Fuchs (1974)). Many doctors erroneously take this to
imply that they can ignore not only the interests of patients other than their own,
but also relevant information from patients other than their own. In an historical
study, Murphy (1981) discusses the non-statistical stance in medicine in France in
the 19th century. This stance also underlies the distinction often made between
statistical lives and identified lives. Society commonly weighs identified lives higher
than statistical lives (Schelling (1968)), leading, for instance, to overspending on the
treatment of rare diseases.
Some extreme advocates of the frequentist interpretation of probability, and critics
of the concept of subjective probability, are also open to the non-statistical stance
(Gigerenzer (1991, pp. 260-261, Examples 1 and 2); Lopes (1981) and Shackle (1949,
p. 71)). Such views also appear in discussions of the Monty Hall problem. For
instance, Baumann (2005) wrote, supporting the non-statistical stance: “If the best
argument so far for switching in an isolated individual case (not in a series of cases)
fails, then one might wonder whether probabilistic arguments say anything at all
about isolated individual cases.”
Incoherence stance [row 1]. Berg & Gigerenzer (2010, p. 148) argue that there
is no irrationality in inconsistent preferences, writing “No studies we are aware of
show that deviators from rational choice earn less money, live shorter lives, or are
less happy.” They argue for ecological rationality, with decision heuristics adapted
to environments. Their ecological argument is not useful for the dilemma presented
here and, in general, is tangential to the problems of inconsistency. Our gedanken-
experiment requires a position to be taken regarding the inconsistency, and environ-
ments and ecologies provide no escape from the dilemma. Other arguments in favor of
outcome-oriented (“correspondence”) policies, with no direct concern for internal co-
herence, have been advanced (Friedman (1953); Hammond (2006) and Smith (2008)).
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These authors do not reject the usefulness of resolving inconsistencies explicitly as
Berg & Gigerenzer (2010) do.
4.5.2 Valid stances
Strong paternalism [row 5; our stance]. To position our upcoming discussion of
various valid stances, we start with our own. We recommend treatment in all cases.
In Case 4.2DS, we expect that virtually all readers will choose treatment. The
information, poor as it is, directs to this decision, as discussed before. In Case 4.3
SI, the individual information added suggests that the client is like the 10,000 others,
making it likely that he is subject to the same inconsistencies as the others. Hence,
we recommend treatment here as we do in Case 4.2DS.
In Cases 4.1S and 4.4I, our data contain no inconsistencies. Yet, following up on
our criticism of the ostrich stance, many studies have demonstrated that discrepancies
as found in the other two cases do occur. General discrepancies of such a fundamental
nature, called preference reversals, were first demonstrated by Lichtenstein & Slovic
(1971), and have been extensively confirmed since (reviewed by Slovic (1995)). Com-
parisons of PE and CE measurements invariably found higher PE values, as in our
example.7 Such discrepancies show that at least one of the measurements concerned
contains biases, and the million dollar question then is what these biases are and how
to correct for them.
Behavioral economics can serve to provide diagnostic tools to identify the biases
underlying the above discrepancy. Bleichrodt (2002) showed that most biases oc-
cur for the PE measurement, which generates serious biases upward.8 This further
supports our recommendation of deviating from the status quo decision suggested
by the sqq = 0.91 observation, and of choosing treatment instead. Hence we also
recommend treatment in Cases 4.1S and 4.4I, even though they do not directly reveal
inconsistencies.
We expect that most readers did not know about the literature just cited when
they started reading this paper, and hence favored the status quo in Cases 4.1S and
4.4I. We hope that now, after learning about this literature, they side with us and
favor treatment in all cases. We similarly hope that readers who knew about this
literature beforehand, favored treatment in all cases from the beginning. At any rate,
7See for instance Baron (1994, §17.1.4), Bleichrodt et al. (2001, p. 1505), Bleichrodt et al.
(2007), Delquie´ (1993), Hershey & Schoemaker (1985), Johnson & Schkade (1989), Morrison (2000),
Seidl & Traub (1999), Slovic et al. (1990, Study 5), Stiggelbout et al. (1994, p. 87).
8Other studies confirming the poor performance of PE measurements include Chilton & Spencer
(2001), Doctor et al. (2010), Dolan (2000, p. 1745), Hershey & Baron (1987, p. 208), Jansen et al.
(1998), Officer & Halter (1968, p. 260), Revicki & Kaplan (1993), Richardson (1994), Stalmeier
(2002), Stiggelbout & de Haes (2001, p. 224), and Torrance (1987)
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from now on, we assume the cited literature on biases to be known in the discussions
that follow.
Weak paternalism [row 4]. This stance may be taken by readers who find an
argument based only on related literature too weak to overrule the stated prefer-
ence of the affected client. Then the status quo may be chosen in Case 4.4 I. On
the other hand, paternalism is still considered necessary when no preference of the
affected individual is clearly stated (Case 4.1S) or when there is clear evidence of
inconsistencies in similar cases (Cases 4.2DS and 4.3SI).
Individual autonomy [rows 1 or 3]. Other readers will take the dividing line
between cases where the individual preference is clearly stated (Cases 4.3SI and 4.4I)
and those where it is not (Cases 4.1S and 4.2DS). They will not want to overrule
the preference of an individual client based on inconsistencies among other clients
(Molenaar et al. (2004, p. 2129)). It leads to the same decisions as the non-
statistical stance but for more valid ethical reasons. Redelmeier & Tversky (1990, p.
1162) argued for the opposite: “Physicians and policy makers may wish to examine
problems from both perspectives to ensure that treatment decisions are appropriate
whether applied to one or to many patients.”
Asymmetric paternalism [rows 1 or 3]. Going against the stated preference of
the client means harming him if he is fully rational (in the sense of satisfying the
classical normative decision-theory principles). Asymmetric paternalism wants to
avoid harming rational clients, and recommends against treatment in Cases 4.3SI
and 4.4I. We acknowledge the harm of choosing treatment for a rational client in the
two cases, but think that it is far more likely that the client violates classical decision
principles and, in this sense, is irrational. Asymmetric paternalism leads to the same
conclusions as the individual autonomy stance whenever the level of rationality of
our clients is unknown.
Strict sampling [row 2]. This stance concerns readers who find arguments based
on the literature too weak. They are willing to overrule preferences that themselves
contain inconsistencies as in Case 4.2DS, and they are even willing to do so based on
similar observations as in Case 4.3SI. However, they find the inconsistencies in the
literature, based on more remote samples and stimuli, too unconvincing. Libertarian
paternalism. This stance may suggest, if possible, using only the CE measurements
yielding ssqq, and avoiding the PE measurements yielding sqqs, in the above cases.
However, such an escape from the dilemma is not possible for us, with PE measure-
ments already available. Libertarian paternalism seeks to avoid dilemmas and offers
no guidance for cases as those considered here.
Cautious and soft paternalism. These terms combine various positions that avoid
coercion, and best correspond with the middle rows.
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Anti-paternalism [row 1]. Row 1 combines the two versions of weak anti-paternalism.
This stance holds that preferences are only overruled if they are inconsistent within
themselves, so that overruling one way or the other in Case 4.2DS cannot be avoided
anyhow. It also implies that one then never relies on indirect suggestions of incon-
sistencies, and hence favors the status quo in the other three cases. In this spirit,
Molenaar et al. (2004, p. 2129) wrote: “The use of a decision aid did not influence
the kind of treatment selected. This is a desirable outcome as the aim of the deci-
sion aid is to assist patients in the decision-making process, and not to prescribe a
course of action.” Bernheim & Rangel (2009) introduced a revealed preference model
where preference, in general, can depend on the context (“ancillaries”), and on no
information other than directly revealed choices. This model accepts preferences as
non-suspect only in the special case where they are not context -dependent; i.e., they
are not part of an inconsistency. This model will formally recommend the status quo
in Cases 4.1S and 4.4I, and probably also in Case 4.3SI if it does not consider outside
information, leading to strong anti-paternalism. Stances that avoid the responsibil-
ity of choosing treatment , for instance, in Cases 4.1S and 4.4I, could be considered
to be forms of paternalism. Similarly, strict adherence to consumer sovereignty can
be interpreted as paternalism. Own assessments of non-commitment are then given
priority over assessments of the client’s best interests. We will, however, adhere to
the most common interpretations, where these stances are taken as what they aim
to be: non-paternalistic.
4.5.3 Some related views on the (non-)existence of preference
in the literature
We start with views that lead to strong paternalism. Throughout the history of de-
cision theory , empirical studies have found inconsistencies in preferences that signal
that biases are effective, and have argued for the desirability to debias (Edwards
(1962); Loewenstein & Ubel (2008, §6.1.2)). One of the most notorious cases con-
cerns the discrepancy between willingness to pay and willingness to accept (Schmidt
& Traub (2009)). Many decision analysts recommended measuring utilities and
other relevant quantities in several manners, and resolving inconsistencies using cross
checks (Keeney & Raiffa (1976, §5.8.3); Kriegler et al. (2009, p. 5046); McCord &
de Neufville (1985); Weinstein et al. (1996b, p. 1257).9
In one form of debiasing, one develops measurement tools that avoid biases.10
9A remarkable study is Elstein et al. (1986), who found a case where more than half of the
physicians’ judgments deviated from the recommendation of a decision analysis.
10The numerous references include Baron et al. (2001), Huber et al. (2001), Lefebvre et al.
(2011), McFadden (2006), Tversky & Kahneman (1981). Loewenstein & Ubel (2008, pp. 1806-
1807) discuss the health domain.
88_Erim BW Li_stand.job
78 Chapter 4. If Nudge Cannot Be Applied
Such debiasing would, like libertarian paternalism, suggest using CE measurements
rather than the more biased PE measurements, if possible. In our cases, such avoid-
ance is not possible since the biased PE measurements have already been imple-
mented. A second form of debiasing is still possible in our cases, because it is carried
out ex post: If we have estimates of the biases, we can correct the measurements
already obtained (Anderson & Hobbs (2002); Bleichrodt et al. (2001); Kahneman
(2003, p. 1468); Viscusi (1995, last paragraph)).
Avoiding and correcting biases is, of course, common in all empirical sciences.
It becomes delicate in decision theory if biases are interpreted as human irrational-
ities. In this case, no clear objectively correct gold standard is available (Tversky
& Kahneman (1981, p. 437 3rd column)), and ethical complications may arise. We
expect that authors working on debiasing are close to our paternalistic stance in row
5. Many authors have argued, as we do, that behavioral economics gives tools to
improve human decisions (Diamond (2008); Kahneman (2003); McFadden (1999);
and Oliver (2013)), which also suggests opposing anti-paternalism.
The constructive view of preference (Payne et al. (1999)) entails that preferences
obtained in measurements are constructed on the spot by participants, just so as
to answer unfamiliar questions. These constructed preferences have little or even
no relation to the underlying true preferences. Some constructivists will conclude
that we should dig deeper to find true preferences (McFadden (1999); Slovic (1995);
Tversky (1996)). In our four cases, where we cannot dig deeper, we would have to
accept that there are biases, and correct for them to our best ability , leading to our
recommendations of treatment.
We now turn to a number of views of preference that lead to anti-paternalism. We
start with constructivists who go in a direction opposite to the one considered above.
They argue that true underlying preferences are a meaningless and non-existing con-
cept (Gu¨th (1995, p. 342); Starmer (1996); discussed by Camerer (1995, p.673)). As
a result, they will probably not search for the implementation of true preferences,
but prefer to minimize intervention in any form, leading to the anti -paternalistic
stance. Closely related to the second constructivist stance just discussed is the view
that people may not be able to have any preference at all in some situations, leading
to incompleteness of preference.11 This may, for instance, happen if different values
are considered to be incommensurable. Incompleteness has often been defended in
descriptive applications. In the prescriptive context considered here, this position is
invalid, amounting to the refusal stance. Valid prescriptive variations of this stance
will probably lead to recommendations that coincide with anti-paternalism.
11See Baucells & Shapley (2008), Bewley (1986), Danan (2008), Dubra et al. (2004), Gilboa
et al. (2008, pp. 179-180), Mandler (2005), Nau (2006a).
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For some authors, the volatility of observed preferences has led to a position
between the existence and non-existence of preference: they consider preferences to be
fundamentally random (Hey (2005); Regenwetter et al. (2011); Wilcox (2008)). We
take their position as merely descriptive, but expect advocates of random preference
not to seek for true preferences and, hence, to be sympathetic to anti-paternalism in
our cases. However, random preferences are untenable in prescriptive applications:
No-one would want a doctor, judge, or waiter in a restaurant to decide by a coin
toss.12
Loewenstein & Ubel (2008) argue that many discussions of paternalistic inter-
ventions require speculations about genuine welfare. Examples are the speculations
that people save too little for retirement, overeat, or lack discipline to quit smoking.
The authors point out that such speculations, whether based on decision utility or
experienced utility, are always problematic. In our gedanken-experiments, the choice
inconsistency problem arises independently of any such speculation. Our recommen-
dation of treatment in all four cases is based on the following two arguments. First,
an underestimation of 0.90 relative to 0.91 is less serious than an overestimation of
0.90 relative to 0.86. Second, extensive literature suggests great overestimations of
probabilities in PE questions. Neither of these two arguments entails direct specula-
tions on genuine welfare.
There have been many other relevant debates in the literature on choice inconsis-
tencies and ways to reconcile and improve them. A complete review of this literature
is beyond the scope of this paper. We only briefly mention debates in intertemporal
choice, where present and future selves can disagree, leading to intertemporal incon-
sistencies and self-control problems (Strotz (1956)). Some have argued that even for
addictions, no outsiders should intervene (“rational addiction”; Becker & Murphy
(1988)), which entails an anti-paternalistic stance. Others have favored interventions
of benevolent social planners (Gruber & Ko¨szegi (2001); Heil et al. (2003)).
4.6 Conclusion
To discuss the central question concerning paternalism that plays a role in many
practical situations, we used a hypothetical gedanken-experiment to maximally clar-
ify the relevant issues (mainly our Case 4.4I). The gedanken-experiment provides
a litmus test for the readers’ stance on paternalism. Providing this test was the
primary purpose of this paper. It shows that one cannot avoid taking a position
(disproving many claims to the contrary in the literature). Our thought experiments
involved only minimal rationality conditions, being transitivity and stochastic domi-
12Randomization in game theory only serves to be unpredictable by opponents.
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nance. Thus, we separated debates about paternalism from debates about rationality
of expected utility or other theories.
We further argued for deviating from what at first sight seems to be the true and
consistent preference of a client in some situations (but on closer inspection need not
be, as we argued). Although it is easy to cast doubt on our stance, as sometimes
it can lead to wrong decisions, it is not easy to suggest better stances. Every other
stance can also lead to wrong decisions, especially if ignoring a large literature on
welldocumented biases, or when serving only to avoid responsibility. The latter is
impossible in our gedanken-experiment as it often is impossible in practice. For
example, medical treatment decisions have to be taken one way or the other , and
money spent on one treatment cannot be spent on another. Our analysis draws
on the vast literature on biases in behavioral economics, and further clarifies how
behavioral economics can be of use in prescriptive decision making.
91_Erim BW Li_stand.job
Chapter 5
Improving One’s Choices by
Putting Oneself in Others’
Shoes - An Experimental
Analysis1
5.1 Introduction
This paper examines the well-known advice: “When deciding, imagine what others
would do in your place.” In an experiment, we investigate how predictions of others’
choices made prior to own choices affect own choices. We, similarly, investigate how
own choices made prior to predictions of others’ choices affect those predictions.
Our study is inspired by Faro & Rottenstreich (2006). In their Experiment 3 they
primarily found that predictions move choices towards risk neutrality for a wide range
of stimuli incorporating gains and losses and very small and very large probabilities.
Under the strong rationality assumption that risk neutrality is normative for the
moderate amounts considered (Tversky & Kahneman (1981); Kahneman & Lovallo
(1993)), the latter effects are desirable. These results are promising. There is a
renewed interest in procedures for debiasing and improving decisions in behavioral
economics (Thaler & Sunstein (2008, nudge)). Thus, Faro & Rottenstreich (2006)
conclude: “Our work suggests one such simple procedure: when choosing for yourself,
start by making predictions of what others would do.”
1This chapter is based on the paper “Improving One’s Choices by Putting Oneself in Others’
Shoes - An Experimental Analysis” co-authored with Kirsten I.M. Rohde and Peter P. Wakker
81
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Our paper follows up on the suggestions made, adding the following contributions.
First, we use real incentives throughout, agreeing with the requirements of experi-
mental economics. Second, we add a clearer test of rationality, being reduction of
preference reversals (weak rationality). In particular, our losses will concern the same
final outcomes as our gains, and will only be different in terms of framing, as with
the original Asian disease problem . Thus we test pure reference dependence while
ruling out income effects. Third, we test a number of predictions of theories advanced
in the literature: learning (Camerer & Ho (1999); Erev & Roth (1998)), construal-
level theory (Trope & Liberman (2010)), risk-as-feelings (Hsee & Weber (1997)), and
risk-as-value (Brown (1965)) combined with anchoring on previous answers.
To focus on the aforementioned questions, we keep our design as simple as possible
in other respects. Thus, following Hsee & Weber (1997, p. 46), we only ask simple
choice questions. We use exactly the choice stimuli of Vieider (2011). These test
framing and reference dependence in their purest form, and use simple probabilities
and moderate outcomes suited for salient real incentives.
We find risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses, and preference reversals, as
common in the literature. Regarding the effects of prediction on choice, prediction
enhances risk aversion, reaching significance for losses. There it enhances strong ra-
tionality by reducing risk seeking. Unfortunately, we do not find any effect on weak
rationality, and preference reversals in choice are unaffected by prior prediction. Re-
garding the effects of prior choice on prediction, prior choice enhances predicted risk
seeking. Our results agree with, primarily, strong anchoring (Faro & Rottenstreich
(2006, p. 537)) and, secondarily, risk-as-value. Our results are also consistent with
risk-as-feelings, because reducing the empathy gap as we did reduced the strength of
risk-as-feelings.
5.2 Experiment
We analyze a monetary version of the Asian Disease problem. The instructions for
participants are in the Appendix.
5.2.1 Stimuli
To ensure anonymity and avoid communication during the experiment, participants
were seated in sight-shielded cubicles. The experiment was conducted using paper
and pencil. The experimental questions are displayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. There
always is a choice between e25 for sure, or a 25% chance at gaining e40 and a 75%
chance at gaining e20, in terms of final outcomes. However, the figures frame the
93_Erim BW Li_stand.job
5.2. Experiment 83
(a) The choice-gain question
(b) The choice-loss question
Figure 5.1 The choice questions
options differently, with Figs. 5.1a/5.2a using gain terms and Figs. 5.1b/5.2b using
loss terms. Figure 5.1 asks for direct choices, and Figure 5.2 asks for predicting the
choice of another participant, randomly and anonymously selected from the other
participants in the experiment.
5.2.2 Participants
115 participants from Erasmus University Rotterdam were recruited. The average age
was 21.2 years, 60% being male. These participants were divided into 9 experimental
sessions with between 10 and 19 participants.
5.2.3 Treatments
In the choice-prediction (CP) treatment participants first made choices (Figure 5.1)
and then predictions (Figure 5.2), and in the prediction-choice (PC) treatment it was
the other way around. Participants always first answered the gain question and then
the loss question.
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(a) The prediction-gain question
(b) The prediction-loss question
Figure 5.2 The prediction questions
5.2.4 Incentives
This experiment was joined with another, unrelated, experiment. Every participant
received a e5 flat fee for participating. In each session one of the participants was
randomly selected to play one of the questions (out of both experiments), randomly
selected, for real. Choices for oneself were implemented as they are. In case of
prediction, a correct prediction was awarded e15. The participant who was selected
to play for real was paid in private, when all other participants had left the room.
For a prediction question, the participant would not know whose choice he/she had
to predict. Thus, participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment that
their choices would be anonymous in the sense that other participants would not
observe them.
5.2.5 Discussion of stimuli
The stimuli in Figure 5.1 were taken from Vieider (2011), using the exact same
wordings. They were especially designed for tractable incentive-compatible pure tests
of preference reversals, using moderate payoffs and probabilities. There are several
reasons for choosing this task. First, it is easy. Second, it can be used to analyze
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both preference reversals and risk attitudes. Third, it has been widely studied and
is well known. We only measure overall risk aversion or risk seeking as simply as
possible, and do not seek to decompose these into components such as utility and
probability weighting (Qiu & Steiger (2011)).
In Figure 5.2, we let the “other” refer to an anonymously chosen single individual
from the other participants in the experiment. McCauley et al. (1971) let the other
refer to the average participant of a group, but average participant may easily be
confounded with average payment, which is why we preferred to avoid this framing.
Faro & Rottenstreich (2006) and Hsee & Weber (1997) studied several framings of
others in detail, and found that an empathy gap that generates differences would
disappear if the other were too familiar to the participant. We chose the formulation
that seemed best suited for our purposes.
5.3 Hypotheses
Choice questions as in Figure 5.1, being monetary versions of the Asian disease prob-
lem, have been extensively studied (Ku¨hberger (1998); Ku¨hberger & Gradl (2013)).
The common finding is risk aversion for gains in Fig. 5.1a, and risk seeking for losses
in Fig. 5.1b, as predicted by prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman (1992)).
How people predict others’ choices, as in Figure 5.2, and how these predictions are
related to own choices, has also been widely studied (Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006,
Hsee and Weber, 1997, and their references). The common finding is that predictions
of choices are closer to risk neutrality than own choices (Daruvala (2007); Faro &
Rottenstreich (2006)). Our main interest is the effect of prior predictions on posterior
choice. We also investigate the reversed effect. The literature is not unanimous on
what we can expect. We will compare four theories, each with different predictions
for our stimuli. Table 5.4 in the results section summarizes the predictions of the
theories. Consulting this table may be convenient at this stage.
Because we did not directly ask for predictions of preference reversals, and obvi-
ously did not reward correct predictions (indirectly derivable from predicted choices)
of those, we will not consider preference reversals in predictions. Preference reversals
will always concern choices.
5.3.1 Learning
Learning entails that participants get to understand the stimuli better as the experi-
ment proceeds, which will enhance rationality. As regards weak rationality, learning
will reduce preference reversals. Thus, for instance, there will be fewer preference
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reversals under PC than under CP. As regards strong rationality, there will be more
risk neutral choices in PC than in CP.
The optimal predictions in our choice experiment are to always predict the ma-
jority choices. Thus, the increased learning for predictions in CP relative to PC
suggests more predictions of risk aversion for gains, and fewer for losses.
5.3.2 Construal Level Theory
Construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman (2010)) predicts that objects that are
psychologically more distant are construed in a more abstract way. Increased dis-
tance induces a stronger focus on central aspects of the object and a weaker focus on
peripheral aspects. In our experiment, it will increase rationality. We operational-
ize psychological distance through social distance. Predicting others’ choices will be
more remote than making own choices. Hence predicted choices of others will be
more rational than own choices. Having prediction precede choice can be expected
to increase the perceived distance and abstract way of viewing, increasing rationality
of choices, resulting in fewer preference reversals, and more risk neutrality, as with
learning. Similarly, having choices precede predictions will generate more risk aver-
sion predicted for gains, and less for losses, which is the same as with learning but
for different reasons.
5.3.3 Risk-as-value
Two theories often put forward when comparing choices to predictions are risk-as-
value and risk-asfeelings. Risk-as-value assumes that people find risk seeking an
admirable characteristic and believe that they possess more of it than others (Clark
et al. (1971), Levinger & Schneider (1969), McCauley et al. (1971), Wallach & Wing
(1968), Willems (1969)). Risk-as-value accordingly predicts that choices are more
risk seeking than predictions. As emphasized by McCauley et al. (1971), risk-as-
value has no direct predictions for the effect of prior prediction on posterior choice
or vice versa. We therefore combine risk-as-value with the plausible hypothesis of
anchoring (Faro & Rottenstreich (2006, p. 537)).
For our main research interest, the effect of prior prediction on choice, the com-
bined effect of risk-as-value and anchoring is as follows. First, because of risk-as-value,
predictions in PC will be more risk averse than choices in CP. Next, because of an-
choring, this extra risk aversion will be extended to choices in PC. The end result
is that prior prediction will make choices more risk averse, both for gains and for
losses. Similarly, predictions in CP will be less risk averse than in PC, again both
for gains and for losses. These effects will not affect the prevalence of preference
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reversals systematically.
5.3.4 Risk-as-feelings
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis states that people predict others to have a similar
risk attitude as themselves, but, due to an empathy gap, less pronounced so, moving
all predictions of others’ choices in the direction of risk neutrality (Slovic (2010)).
Faro & Rottenstreich (2006, “methods” on p. 537 and “results and discussion” on
pp. 537-538) find the following effect of prior prediction on posterior choice and vice
versa. In the PC treatment, when choosing, participants implicitly acknowledge the
empathy gap and adjust for it, leading to an increased discrepancy between choice
and prediction. This effect is opposite to anchoring. For gains we then get more risk
averse choices for PC than for CP, and for losses we get fewer risk averse choices.
Similarly, CP will yield fewer risk averse predictions than PC for gains and more risk
averse predictions for losses. Moves away from risk neutrality increase preference
reversals and, hence, risk-as-feelings suggests more preference reversals under PC
than under CP.
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 shows the percentages of safe choices and safe-choice predictions for every
treatment and ask. Table 5.2 shows percentages of preference reversals. Eyeballing
the data suggests that we have the usual risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses,
and preference reversals. Further, we have anchoring, with second answers close to
first answers: choices close to predictions in PC and predictions close to choices in
CP. Risk aversion is always higher in PC than in CP, and preference reversals are not
affected by treatment. These observations are confirmed by the following statistical
analyses.
Safe Choices p-value
CP(n=58) PC(n=57) (2-Tailed)
Choic-Gain 59% 67% 0.375
Choice-Loss 17% 33% 0.048
Prediction-Gain 52% 72% 0.027
PRediction-Loss 16% 28% 0.104
Table 5.1 percentage of safe choices; p-values of Mann-
Whitney U tests.
Logit regression
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CP(n=58) PC(n=57)
Choice 47%, 5% 42%, 9%
Table 5.2 Percentages of participants exhibiting preference reversals in choices [com-
mon, uncommon]
Coefficient p-Value(2-Tailed)
Constant 0.22 0.330
Loss -1.73 0.000***
Prediction -0.11 0.503
PC 0.70 0.006***
Table 5.3 Logit regression
Table 5.3 shows the results of a logit regression with answer (=1 if safe) as de-
pendent variable, and dummy-variables loss, prediction, and PC as independent vari-
ables, clustered on subjects. The results confirm the sign (loss) and treatment (PC)
effects observed in Table 5.1. They also confirm the similarity between choices and
predictions consistent with anchoring. Interaction effects between the independent
variables were insignificant and therefore omitted from the regression. These results
will be confirmed by the non-parametric analyses given next.
Risk attitudes and preference reversals
The risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses, both for choices and predic-
tions, are significant at p = 0.01 except for gains under CP. For preference reversals,
we consider two types (Bardsley et al. (2010, p. 131); Maafi (2011)) . Common pref-
erence reversals concern a safe choice for gains and a risky choice for losses, which is
the common finding. Uncommon preference reversals concern the opposite choices.
At least 50% of the participants exhibit preference reversals, mostly in the common
direction.
Comparison of choices and predictions
Within treatment PC, 67% of risk averse choices is not significantly different from
72% predicted risk averse choices.2 We similarly find no differences between the other
predictions and choices within treatments. Both for PC and CP, the correlations
between predictions and choices always exceed 0.3 and are always significant at p =
0.01, whereas none of the other variables in Table 5.1 are significantly correlated.
Treatment effects
All observations under PC reveal more risk aversion than under CP, twice signif-
2It may be argued that the predictions in PC should be compared with the choices in CP (which
are a priori choices not following after a prediction task). Here the differences are not significant
either.
99_Erim BW Li_stand.job
5.5. Summary, implications for theories, and related literature 89
icant at p = 0.05 and once marginally significant (Table 5.1). The total number of
preference reversals does not differ significantly between treatments. Common pref-
erence reversals are reduced somewhat when going from CP to PC, but uncommon
preference reversals are increased.
5.5 Summary, implications for theories, and related
literature
Our results on risk attitudes and preference reversals agree with common findings in
the literature. The within-treatment comparisons of choice and prediction confirm
anchoring, with second answers in a treatment always close to first answers. This
anchoring is consistent with cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1957)) and false con-
sensus (Ross et al. (1977)). Given anchoring, the higher risk aversion in PC than
in CP confirms risk-as-value. The absence of interaction between independent vari-
ables in the logit regression further supports a general increase of risk aversion due
to prediction, for gains and losses alike, in agreement with risk-as-value. Prediction
does not improve weak rationality (avoiding preference reversals), and neither does it
improve strong rationality (risk neutrality) for gain choices. It only improves strong
rationality for loss choices. Table 5.4 summarizes our results and the predictions of
the theories considered.
Our experiment was designed to be maximally simple and, hence, we only mea-
sured binary choices and predictions (risk averse or risk seeking), and not indifferences
as in Faro & Rottenstreich (2006, p. 539) or Hsee & Weber (1997). In the termi-
nology of Faro & Rottenstreich (2006, p. 539), our questions concern the type of
emotions (risk averse or risk seeking), and not the intensity. In our design, if each
participant had been a perfect predictor, maximizing expected payoff, then each
would predict the majority choices, which is risk aversion for gains and risk seeking
for losses. In other words, then we would have had 100% risk aversion predictions
for gains and 100% risk seeking predictions for losses. In reality, participants’ pre-
dictions were close to their own choices within each treatment, as confirmed by the
statistical analyses. At the group level, the percentages of risk aversion were close
for choice and prediction in both treatments. If we could treat the group of subjects
in each treatment as one decision maker, then our finding would entail probability
matching (individuals not choosing best in all situations, but having their overall
choice percentages match real probability distributions; Bitterman (1965); Vulkan
(2002)). That is, we have found a kind of probability matching at the group level.
Many papers have studied the discrepancies between prediction and choice, and
we will not seek to completely review this literature. McCauley et al. (1971) com-
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pared the risk aversion in choices that participants make for themselves with the
predicted risk attitudes of others as we did, with a CP treatment and a PC treat-
ment. Unlike us, they did not consider losses and did not employ real incentives.
Moreover, there was an average-other/average-payoff confound in their design. They
found support for risk-as-value, but no anchoring.
Risk-as-feelings was introduced in a careful study by Hsee & Weber (1997). They
found the opposite of McCauley et al. (1971), being less risk aversion in predictions,
and supporting risk-asfeelings. They found that the empathy gap underlying risk-
as-feelings becomes smaller as the others to be predicted are closer, reducing the
effects of risk-as-feelings. This was confirmed by Hsee & Weber (1999) and Faro
& Rottenstreich (2006). The latter added a refinement. They noted that less risk
aversion for predictions than choices in Hsee & Weber (1997) always coincided with
more risk neutrality. Faro and Rottenstreich found that the latter effect was the
general one, leading to more risk aversion for predictions than choices whenever
choices are risk seeking. Their finding was confirmed by Daruvala (2007). Combined
with our finding of anchoring, it suggests that prior prediction can improve strong
rationality. Our findings confirm so for losses, but not for gains.
Our findings can be reconciled with the findings on risk-as-feelings because the
others whose choices were to be predicted by our participants were closer and more
similar in our study than in previous studies. They were participants in the same
group and experiment, being in the exact same situation as the participants during
the experiment, which reduced the empathy gap. Combining our findings with those
of Faro & Rottenstreich (2006) or Hsee & Weber (1997) suggests that prior predictions
improve rationality best if there is an empathy gap, but loses most of its force if
there is no empathy gap. Another difference is that the preceding studies concerned
intensities of emotions, which are underestimated in predictions, whereas our study
concerned types of emotions. The latter are subject to false consensus, leading to
anchoring (Faro & Rottenstreich (2006, p. 539)).
We find no support for construal level theory or learning. The latter may be
because there was only limited opportunity to learn, and learning may only become
effective after more repetitions of the same task.
5.6 Conclusion
We investigated the saying “When deciding, imagine what others would do in your
place,” following up on promising first results (Faro & Rottenstreich (2006) or Hsee
& Weber (1997)). Those results suggested that first imagining what others do may
increase rationality of choice and, thus, provide a useful addition to modern nudging
101_Erim BW Li_stand.job
5.6. Conclusion 91
Risk Aversion Risk Aversion Preference
for Gains for Losses Reversals
Learning ↓ ↑ ↓
Construal Level Theory ↓ ↑ ↓
Achoring&Risk-as-Value ↑ ↑ -
Risk-as-Feeling ↑ ↓ ↑
Our results ↗ ↑ -
(a) Predicted changes in choices when going from CP to PC
Risk Aversion for Gains Risk Aversion for Losses
Learning ↑ ↓
Construal Level Theory ↑ ↓
Achoring&Risk-as-Value ↓ ↓
Risk-as-Feeling ↓ ↑
Our results ↓ ↘
(b) Predicted changes in predictions when going from PC to CP
↑ increase; ↓ decrease; ↗ increasing trend but not significant; ↘ decreasing trend
but not significant; - no effect
Table 5.4 Summary of results and predictions of theories
techniques. Our experiment used simple and well-known stimuli with real incentives
and careful framing, all targeted towards testing the aforementioned hypothesis. We
found an improvement of strong rationality (risk neutrality) for losses, but not for
gains, and we found no improvement of weak rationality (avoiding framing effects
and preference reversals). Conversely, predictions for gains were closer to risk neu-
trality when preceded by choice. Predictions for losses were not affected by preceding
choices.
Our results best fit with, primarily, strong anchoring and, secondarily, risk-as-
value. They can also be reconciled with findings on risk-as-feelings. Thus prior
prediction can improve rationality if there is an empathy gap, as shown by preceding
studies, but loses much of its force if the empathy gap is reduced, as shown by our
study. Prior prediction is still useful when people face losses. Predictions are subject
to a kind of probability matching at the group level.
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Conclusion
This thesis has made a special effort to explore some relevant issues on (ir)rationality.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with ways to rekon with irrationalites if they cannot be
avoided. Chapter 2 improves the methodology to measure preferences by proposing
a new incentive system on individual decision-making: the prior incentive system
(Prince). Chapter 3 addresses the issue of irrationality in decisions under ambigu-
ity. Chapter 4 answers the question of why we steer people away from irrationality.
Chapter 4 discusses whether we should correct people’s irrationality by imposing a
better decision when freedom of choice cannot be realized. Chapter 4 concludes with
recommending strong paternalism and provides a litmus test for people’s views on
paternalism. Chapter 5 answers the question how to make people less irrational. The
chapter studies the social influences on people’s decision-making processes and offers
possible approaches to nudge people away from irrationality. In the present chapter,
the main conclusions and results are summarized. Furthermore, at the end of this
chapter, some ideas for future research are discussed.
Chapter 2 introduces Prince (prior incentive system), a new incentive system
preferable to current popular incentive systems for individual decision-making. Prince
improves measurements of preferences without affecting those preferences themselves.
In the experiment, we demonstrated that the implementation of the tangible real
choice situation (RCS) makes the incentive compatibility completely transparent
to subjects. This improves the weakness of Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism,
which is difficult for subjects to understand. Additionally, with Prince, we show
that the preference reversals disappear. When decisions elicited by choice list and
by matching are compared, both using Prince, no significant differences are found
between matching and choice list. Prince resolves a number of other problems: (a)
violations of isolation; (b) misperceptions of bargaining; (c) strategic answering in
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adaptive experiments. Not only do we avoid deception, but furthermore this is com-
pletely clear and verifiable for the subjects. Thus Prince provides more valid and
transparent measurements of preferences.
Chapter 3 finds no support for outcome dependence of ambiguity attitudes in
between-outcome comparisons, i.e., when changing outcomes while keeping the source
of uncertainty fixed. This adds to the same finding in the literature keeping outcomes
fixed while changing sources. We do find support for event-dependence of ambigu-
ity attitudes between sources, i.e. when changing the source of uncertainty. This
evidence supports event-based theories of ambiguity such as prospect theory and
multiple priors against outcome-based theories such as the smooth model. We also
find support for event-dependence of ambiguity aversion within sources, where aver-
sion changes to seeking if events change from likely to unlikely. This finding again
supports event-based ambiguity theories against outcome-based theories. It also
supports the empirical importance of insensitivity besides aversion to ambiguity. For
parametric families to analyze ambiguity, more than for risk, it is important to cap-
ture insensitivity (inverse-S) properly. Hence parametric families that can properly
model insensitivity will be most suited to analyze ambiguity attitudes.
In Chapter 4, to discuss the central question concerning paternalism that plays
a role in many practical situations, we used a hypothetical gedanken-experiment
to maximally clarify the relevant issues (mainly our Case 4.4I). The gedanken-
experiment provides a litmus test for the readers’ stance on paternalism. Providing
this test was the primary purpose of this paper. It shows that one cannot avoid
taking a position (disproving many claims to the contrary in the literature). Our
thought experiments involved only minimal rationality conditions, being transitivity
and stochastic dominance. Thus, we separated debates about paternalism from de-
bates about rationality of expected utility or other theories. We further argued for
deviating from what at first sight seems to be the true and consistent preference of
a client in some situations (but on closer inspection need not be, as we argued).
Whereas it is easy to cast doubt on our stance, as it can sometimes lead to wrong
decisions, it is less easy to suggest better stances. Every other stance can also lead to
wrong decisions, especially if ignoring a large body of literature on well-documented
biases, or when serving only to avoid responsibility. The latter is impossible in our
gedanken-experiment as it often is impossible in practice. For example, medical
treatment decisions have to be taken one way or the other, and money spent on one
treatment cannot be spent on another. Our analysis draws on the vast literature on
biases in behavioral economics, and further clarifies how behavioral economics can
be of use in prescriptive decision making.
Chapter 5 investigates the saying ”When deciding, imagine what others would do
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in your place” following up on promising first results (Faro and Rottenstreich 2006;
Hsee and Weber 1997). Those results suggested that first imagining what others do
may increase rationality of choice and, thus, provides a useful addition to modern
nudging techniques. Our experiment used simple and well-known stimuli with real
incentives and careful framing, all targeted towards testing the hypothesis suggested
above. We found an improvement of strong rationality (risk neutrality) for losses,
but not for gains, and we found no improvement of weak rationality (avoiding fram-
ing effects and preference reversals). Conversely, predictions for gains were closer to
risk neutrality when preceded by choice. Predictions for losses were not affected by
preceding choices. Our results best fit with, primarily, strong anchoring and, sec-
ondarily, risk-as-value. They can also be reconciled with findings on risk-as-feelings.
Thus prior prediction can improve rationality if there is an empathy gap, as shown by
preceding studies, but loses much of its force if the empathy gap is reduced, as shown
by our study. Prior prediction is still useful when people face losses. Predictions are
subject to a kind of probability matching at the group level.
Investigations of (ir)rationality have many implications both theoretically and
practically. This thesis has investigated some issues associated with irrationality.
Much remains to be explored. Nevertheless, investigations of (ir)rationality will
mainly focus on the three questions what, why, and how. The why question has been
widely discussed and to a large extent consensus has been reached to improve people’s
decision-making. Opinions diverge only when it comes to whether we should limit
people’s choice liberty. It is still debated as to what is rational. In addition to what
has been studied in this thesis, further research should provide more insights into the
identification of (ir)rationalities in this dynamic and complex world. For instance,
we need better models to describe the role of reference points in people’s behavior.
Discovering anomalies from people’s decisions is the first step. Investigating the
underlying causes of these anomalies comes next, and can go hand in hand with
research on how to correct the anomalies. Answers to the how question have the
most direct implications for our daily life. Future research efforts are worthwhile in
directing people towards rationality.
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Irrationeel: Wat, Waarom, en
Hoe
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt enige relevante kwesties over (ir)rationaliteiten. Hoofd-
stukken 2 en 3 gaan over manieren om met irrationaliteiten rekening te houden als ze
niet vermeden kunnen worden. Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert een methodologische verbe-
tering om preferenties te meten door een nieuw incentive systeem voor te stellen voor
individuele beslissingen: het prior incentive system (Prince). Hoofdtuk 3 behandelt
irrationaliteiten in beslissen onder ambigu¨ıteit. Hoofdstuk 4 beantwoordt de vraag
waarom we mensen proberen te behoeden voor irrationaliteiten. Het bediscussieert
of we de irrationaliteiten van mensen moeten corrigeren door een betere beslissing op
te leggen wanneer keuzevrijheid niet gerealiseerd kan worden. Het hoofdstuk sluit af
met het aanbevelen van sterk paternalisme en verschaft een lakmoestest voor visies
op paternalisme. Hoofdtsuk 5 beantwoordt de vraag hoe mensen minder irrationeel
te maken. Het hoofdstuk bestudeert de sociale invloeden op beslissings-processen and
biedt mogelijke benaderingen om mensen van irrationaliteiten weg te ”nudgen”. In
dit hoofdstuk worden de belangrijkste conclusies en resultaten samengevat. Tenslotte
worden aan het einde enige ideeA˜n voor toekomstig onderzoek gepresenteerd.
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert Prince (prior incentive system), een nieuw incentive
systeem dat te prefereren is boven tegenwoordig populaire incentive s ystemen voor
individuele beslissingen. Prince verbetert de metingen van preferenties zonder ze te
beA˜¯nvloeden In een experiment tonen we dat het gebruik van een tastbare werkelijke
keuzesituatie (RCS: real choice situation) de incentive compatibility geheel duidelijk
maakt voor subjecten. Dit verbetert een zwakte van het Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
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mechanisme, hetgeen moeilijk voor subjecten te begrijpen is. We tonen verder dat
preference reversals verdwijnen als we Prince gbruiken. Wanneer choice lists en
matching procedures onder Prince worden vergeleken, worden geen significante ver-
schillen gevonden. Prince lost een aantal andere problemen op: (a) schendingen van
isolatie; (b) mispercepties van onderhandelingen; (c) strategisch antwooren in adap-
tieve experimentens. Niet alleen vermijden we deceptie, maar, meer dan dat, dit is
geheel duidelijk en verifieerbaar voor de subjecten. Zo verschaft Prince beter geldige
en duidelijkere metingen van preferenties.
In Hoofdstuk 3 vinden we geen steun voor de hypothese dat ambigu¨ıteitshoudingen
afhangen van uitkomsten in een tussen-uitkomsten vergelijking, dwz wanneer uitkom-
sten veranderen terwijl de bron van onzekerheid vast gehouden wordt. Dit bevestigt
dezelfde bevindingen in de literatuur waarbij uitkomsten vast worden gehouden ter-
wijl bronnen van onzekerheid worden gevarieerd. We vinden wel steun voor de af-
hankelijkheid van ambigu¨ıteits-attituden van gebeurtenissen wanneer de bron van
onzekerheid varieert. Deze evidentie steunt theoriee¨n van ambigu¨ıteit die op ge-
beurtenissen gebeurd zijn, zoals prospect theorie en multiple priors theoriee¨n, tegen
theoriee¨n gebaseerd op uitkomsten, zoals het welbekende smooth model. We vinden
ook steun voor de afhankelijkheid van ambigu¨ıteitsafkeer van gebeurtenissen, waar-
bij afkeer van ambigu¨ıteit verandert in voorkeur als gebeurtenissen veranderen van
waarschijnlijk in onwaarschijnlijk. Deze bevinding steunt andermaal gebeurtenis-
gebaseerde theoriee¨n tegenover uitkomst-gebaseerde theoriee¨n. Het onderschrijft ook
het empirische belang van ongevoeligheid naast afkeer. Voor parametrische fami-
lies voor het analyseren van ambigu¨ıteit, meer nog dan bij risico, is het belangrijk
om ongevoeligheid (inverse-S) goed te modelleren. Daarom zijn parametrische fa-
milies die ongevoeligheid goed behandelen het meest geschikt voor de analyse van
ambigu¨ıteits-attituden.
In Hoofdstuk 4 gebruiken we een hypothetisch gedachten-experiment om een cen-
trale vraag over paternalisme aan de orde te stellen die een rol speelt in vele practische
situaties. We gebruiken het gedachten-experiment om de relevante kwesties zo dui-
delijk mogelijk te maken (vooral Case 4.4I). Het gedachten-experiment verschaft een
lakmoes test voor het standpunt van de lezer aangaande paternalisme. Deze test
verschaffen is het hoofddoel van dit paper. Het toont dat men niet kan vermijden om
stelling te nemen (waarmee vele tegengestelde beweringen uit de literatuur worden
ontkracht). Onze gedachten-experimenten gebruiken slechts minimale rationaliteits
condities, namelijk transitiviteit en stochastische dominantie. Zo kunnen we over
paternalisme debatteren zonder een standpunt in te nemen over de rationaliteit van
verwacht nut of andere theoriee¨n. We pleiten ervoor in sommige situaties af te wijken
van wat op het eerste gezicht de ware en consistente preferentie van een clie¨nt lijkt
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te zijn (maar dat bij nadere beschouwing niet was, zoals we beargumenteren).
Terwijl het gemakkelijk is ons standpunt in twijfel te trekken, omdat het soms
tot verkeerde beslissingen leidt, is het niet zo gemakkelijk om een beter standpunt
aan te geven. Ieder ander standpunt kan namelijk ook tot verkeerde beslissingen
leiden, vooral als men daarbij een uitgebreide en wel-gedocumenteerde literatuur over
biases negeert, of als het alleen maar dient om verantwoordelijkheid te ontlopen. Dat
laatste is onmogelijk in ons gedachten-experiment, zoals het vaak onmogelijk is in
praktische situaties. Bijvoorbeeld, medische behandelingen moeten gedaan worden
op de eenof andere manier, en geld dat is uitgegeven aan een behandeling kan niet
uitgegeven worden aan een andere behandeling. Onze analyse is gebaseerd op een
uitgebreide literatuur over biases in behavioral economics, en maakt verder duidelijk
hoe behavioral economics gebruikt kan worden voor prescriptieve beslissingen.
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt het gezegde ”Bij het nemen van beslissingen, stel je voor
wat een ander in jouw plaats zou doen,”voortbordurend op veelbelovende resulta-
ten van Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) en Hsee and Weber (1997). Die resultaten
suggereerden dat het zich eerst inbeelden wat een ander zou doen de rationaliteit
van keuzen bevordert en, dus, een nuttige toevoeging zijn van moderne nudging
technieken. Ons experiment gebruikt simpele en wel-bekende stimuli met werkelijke
betalingen en zorgvuldige framing, allemaal gericht op het testen van de boven ge-
suggereerde hypothese. We vinden een verbetering van sterke rationaliteit (risico
neutraliteit) voor verliezen, maar niet voor winsten, en we vinden geen verbetering
van zwakke rationaliteit (het vermijden van framing effects en preference reversals).
Van de andere kant, voorspellingen voor winsten liggen dichter bij risico neutraliteit
wanneer ze vooraf gegaan werden door keuzen. Voorspellingen voor verliezen worden
niet be¨ınvloed door voorafgaande keuzen. Onze resultaten passen het beste bij, in de
eerste plaats, een sterk anker-effect en dan, ten tweede, risico-als-waarde. Ze kunnen
ook verklaard wrden met risk-as-feelings. Daardoor kan vooraf-voorspellen rationa-
liteit verbeteren als er een empathie-gap is, zoals getoond door eerdere studies, maar
het verliest zijn kracht als de emphatie-gap gereduceerd is, zoals aangetoond door
onze studie. Vooraf voorspellen is wel nuttig wanneer mensen met verliezen te maken
hebben. Voorspellingen zijn onderhevig aan een soort van kans-matching op groeps
niveau.
Onderzoeking naar (ir)rationaliteiten hebben veel implicaties, zowel theoretisch
als practisch. Dit proefschrift heeft enige van die implicaties onderzocht. Onder-
zoekingen van (ir)rationaliteit zullen zich voornamelijk richten op de drie vragen
waarom, wat, en hoe. De waarom vraag is uitgebreid bediscussieerd en in grote
mate is overeenstemming bereikt over hoe beslissingen van mensen te verbeteren.
De meningen lopen uiteen over de vraag hoe we de vrijheid van mensen moeten be-
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perken. Discussies duren voort over de vraag wat rationaliteit is. In toevoeging tot
wat onderzocht is in dit proefschrift, moet verder onderzoek meer inzicht geven in de
identificatie vn (ir)rationaliteien in deze dynamische en complexe wereld. Bijvoor-
beeld hebben we betere modellen nodig om de rol van referentiepunten in menselijk
gedrag te beschrijven. Anomaliee¨n ontdekken in menselijke beslissingen is de eerste
stap. De onderliggende oorzaken onderzoeken is de volgende stap, en deze kan hand
in hand gaan met onderzoek naar hoe de anomaliee¨n te corrigeren. Antwoorden op de
hoe vraag hebben het meest direct implicaties voor ons dagelijkse leven. Onderzoek
is gewenst naar methoden om mensen meer tot rationaliteit te brengen.
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l)IRRATIONALITY: WHAT, WHY AND HOW
It is all about rationality as far as behavioural economics are concerned. However, no
census can be reached as to what is rationality. With the unsettled controversies over
rationality, it may help to see it from a different angle. This thesis has made a special
effort to explore some relevant issues on (ir)rationality. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 answer
the question what is irrationality. Chapter 2 improves the methodology to measure irratio -
na lity by proposing a new incentive system on individual decision-making: the prior
incentive system (Prince). Chapter 3 addresses the issue of irrationality in decisions under
ambiguity. Chapter 4 answers the question of why we steer people away from irratio -
nality. Chapter 4 discusses whether we should correct people's irrationality by imposing a
better decision when freedom of choice cannot be realized. Chapter 4 concludes with
recommending strong paternalism and provides a litmus test for people’s views on pater -
nalism. Chapter 5 answers the question how to make people less irrational. Chapter 5
studies the social influences on people’s decision-making processes and offers possible
approaches to nudge people away from irrationality.
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